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Fig. 1. Florida's chief export cities in 1860. Map by author. 
Introduction 
From the moment of its admission to the Union in 1845, Florida's economy was 
structured around its numerous ports and the ability to ship resou rces to centers of 
production and commerce. The population of Florida reflected this reality. Most 
Floridians were part-timers, snowbirds who came south not for the enjoyable 
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weather so much as the economic opportunities created by climate and peninsular 
geography. During the peak season of December to April in the 1840s and 18505, 
the Gulf Coast's population swelled with the arrival of Northerners and foreigners 
seeking profit in Apalachicola, primarily in the cash crop industry of cotton. Down 
the coast in Tampa, the cattle industry was growing as local ranchers found markets 
in the Caribbean Sea. The ability to connect cotton and cattle with buyers was 
facilitated by Florida's approximately 1,800 mites of coastline and an expanding 
shipping industry. 
Throughout its in itial fifteen years of statehood, shipping defined the state's 
economy. During the winter months, non·southerners by birth far outnumbered the 
permanent or lifelong residents of the Florida Gulf-Coast. 1 Though it was the 
southernmost state in the Union, it would have been a stretch to consider Florida 
truly a part of the South, either in demographics or culture. In the decades 
preceding the American Civil War, the state's centers of popu lation were exclusively 
port cities inhabited by a regionally, nationally, and racially diverse lot.2 A lack of 
cohesive state identity made Florida less of an actor and more of an object in the 
conflict that was to come. 
On the tenth of January, 1861, Florida became the third state to secede from 
the Union. The decision was no doubt strongly motivated by Florida's slaveholding 
interests - a move to reject the narrow election of the nation's first Republican 
1 Lynn Willoughby, Fair to MiddJin': The Antebellum Cotton Trade o[the 
Apalachicola/Chatahoochee River Valley (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama 
Press, 1993), 12. 
2 Wilma Louise Handley, "The Labourers are all slaves: Slavery and Hiring-Out in an 
Antebellum Gulf Coast Community" (M.A. Thesis, University of West Florida, 1999), 
54. 
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President, a party founded on an anti-slavery platform. On the eve of secession, 
Florida's slave owners were wealthy in chattel property. The state was by far the 
least populous in the South, totaling only 140,424 souls, yet 44 percent of these 
Floridians were in bondage.3 Protecting slavery gave those in a position of power 
and influence in Florida a cultural and economic motivation for secession. 
Ironically, the actions taken to protect the institution only hastened its demise. 
tearing apart in four years of bloody conflict what had been entrenched in southern 
culture over the preceding three centuries. The exploitation of slave labor had 
created enormous wealth. The 1860 census calculated the cash value of farms in the 
state to be $16,435,7274 . Southern plantation owners and politicians had little 
incentive to tinker with the structure of their work force. 
While the Deep South sought to protect its slave culture, Florida elected to 
join the Confederacy because of the economic considerations unique to the 
geography of a peninsular state. Economic considerations were important both in 
Florida's decision to secede and in the Union and Confederacy's desire to possess 
Florida, The state's importance to the United States and the emerging Confederacy 
as secession became apparent was determined, in large part, by its port cities. For 
the South, Florida's abundance of coastline made protection of slavery a subordinate 
consideration to tariff reform. With Florida's loyalties up for grabs, the Union and 
3 U.S. Census Bureau, Census Material from 1840 to 1890, Historical Census 
Browser, University of Virginia, 
http://fisher.lib.vi rginia.edu/collections/ ril stats/histcensus/i ndex.h tm!. 
4 U.s. Census Office. Agriculture of the United States in 1860: Compiled from the 
Original Returns of the Eight Census (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
1864). 
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Confederacy both placed high value on Florida's allegiance because of the cotton and 
cattle trades. These concerns, therefore, drove the underlying motivations of the 
principal actors in Florida's secession. 
Florida's ports provided a potential gateway for foreign goods into the North 
American continent. The importation of those goods, however, came at a cost. 
Southern critics of the 1861 Morrill Tariff Act pointed to the disparate effect high 
protective tariffs had on the economic growth of the southern agricultural states as 
opposed to the northern industrial states. The abi lity to be free from high protective 
tariffs was an inducement to Florida business leaders to support the secession 
movement Because shipping was the dominant industry in a largely unsettled, 
underdeveloped state, the stakes were high in determining Florida's allegiance. The 
Federal government's main interest in Florida ports as they related to import tariffs 
was not the protection of a continued stream of income, but rather the protection of 
points of entry to domestic markets. The ability to circumvent approved ports 
would sh ift traffic to seceded ports and greatly diminish the amount of federal 
revenue col lected. 
The cotton trade served as the stimu lus for exponential economic growth of 
the United States throughout the nineteenth century. Together with the 
development of internal transportation, cotton was the catalyst for an increased 
standard of living and internal tax revenue. The delivery of American cotton to 
foreign ports was necessary in order to purchase foreign goods and to fund the 
expanding federal government. The unpredictability offuture cotton output and 
market share made Florida's ports a valued asset to the Federal government and the 
-• 
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Rebel forces. While Florida's ports cou ld not match the output of its larger 
competitors, the ability to divert cotton traffic to Apalachicola, Pensacola, 
Fernandina, and the like was an interest worth protecting. 
5 
The United States government and the emerging Confederate States of 
America recognized the enormous potential of Florida for providing the beef 
necessary to field vast armies. While Florida's total cattle holdings were small in 
comparison to several other states of the south, its per capita cattle holdings ranked 
near the top. meaning local demand was small enough to export huge quantities of 
cattle without negatively impacting the state's civilian population. Florida's 
geographical location to the east of the Mississippi River made its cattle holdings 
more important to the Confederate war effort as Union victories cut off western 
supplies. Lastly, Florida's ports created the opportunity to move cattle out of state 
more efficiently to deliver to troops elsewhere. Th is possibility was recognized and 
utilized by both sides, with the Union expending considerable effort to keep Florida 
cattle out of the north Florida, Alabama, and Louisiana ports. 
6 
Chapter 1 
High Tariffs in a State of Ports 
Alexander Hamilton articulated what became the essence of early American 
economic policy in his 1791 Report on Manufactures. The report stated a preference 
for moderate import duties, allowing encouragement of domestic industry but not 
necessarily protection. Hamilton had long recognized the dangers of an unbalanced 
tariff, warning "exorbitant duties on imported articJes ... tend to render other classes 
of the community tributary in an improper degree to the manufacturing classes to 
whom they give a premature monopoly of the market "1 In an effort to pay down the 
new nation's revolutionary wa r debt, Hamilton sought to maximize government 
revenue and promote efficiency in domestic industry through what he deemed to be 
reasonable tariffrates.2 Thomas Jefferson argued that these policies would generate 
geographic favoritism and disadvantage the agrarian South. This sectional dispute 
appea red aga in on a recurring basis throughout the antebellum nineteenth century, 
to be settled along with the even more contentious issue of slavery with four years 
of bloodshed. 
Trade and tariffs played a significant role in the North/South fracture of the 
Civil War, and, for Florida, the desire to be free offederal import duties was 
important in the state's secession decision. Florida's manufacturing industry was 
non-existent in 1860. Its economy was emerging in agriculture, cattle ranching. and 
most importantly, sh ipping. The federal government valued the continued incl usion 
1 Roy P. Fairfield, ed., The Federalist Papers (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1981), 93. 
2 Douglas A. Irwin, "The Aftermath of the Report on Manufactures," The Journal of 
Economic History 64:3 (September 2004): 800. 
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of Florida in the Union in part due to the tariff revenue implications of a successful 
secession. The loss of Florida to a free and independent Confederate States of 
America would have resulted in a decline in tax revenue collected not only in the 
South. bu t in the North as well. The protection of U.S, import revenue was 
contingent upon the preservation of the entire coastline of the United States, 
including the long peninsular coast of Florida. 
The issue of tariffs had been a source of strain on relations between the 
North and South from the inception of the United States. Well before independence, 
climate and soil conditions prevented the population centers of the northeast from 
serving as the breadbasket of the continent. While plantations grew in the fertile 
south, New England industry developed around commerce and the high seas, 
producing generations of fishermen, longshoremen, and a strong merchant class. 
As passed by Congress in the nascent days of the republic, import duties served to 
protect the shipping industries of the North, but did little to incubate manufacturi ng 
firms developing in the new nation. The War of 1812 provided a system shock to 
the economy of the northeastern states. Manufacturing firms had arisen during the 
conflict as trade with Europe had been arrested by the British blockade.3 With the 
peace came commerce, and therefore competition from large, skil led French and 
3 F.W. Taussig, The Tariff History a[the United States, Part 1,5'" ed. (New York: G.P. 
Putnam & Sons, 1910), Online edition prepared by William Harshbarger. The Ludwig 
von Mjses Institute, © 2003, hltp: //mises,orelelexlsltauss ig.pdf, 10. 
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British manufacturers, flooding the market with less expensive imported goods and 
forcing inexperienced but promising American manufacturers out of business.4 
Because of the struggling incipient American industry's inability to compete 
with foreign firms, Congress passed a series of protective tariffs designed to 
incubate domestic manufacturing by protecting it from outside competition. By 
definition, these protective tariffs were not for purposes of revenue alone. As the 
scope and magnitude of the government was exponentially smaller than the modern 
enormous machine, much less revenue was needed to support the government; 
therefore taxation was confined to primarily import duties and alcohol. These 
import duties were the bane of traders' and merchants' existence. Driving up costs 
for importers that were then passed on to wholesalers and merchants, the trade 
tariffs resulted in higher than market costs for imported goods to consumers in the 
United States. 
Import tariffs were the largest single source of revenue every year of the 
nation's existence from 1789-1860, with the sole exception of 1836.5 The sale of 
public lands briefly overtook customs duties as the chief source of government 
revenue in the mid-1830s, but aside from that anomaly, approximately 90 percent of 
federal revenue emanated from tariffs between 1820 and 1860.6 The coastal states, 
by definition, experienced a more direct impact from these tariffs. The ports of New 
4 Paul Calore, The Causes a/the Civil War: The Political, Cultural, Economic, and 
Territorial Disputes Between North and South Uefferson, NC: McFarland & Co. 
Publishers, 2008), 32. 
5 Robert A McGuire & T. Norman Van Cott, "The Confederate Constitution, Tariffs, 
and the Laffer Relationship," Economic Inquiry 40:3 Duly 2002): 429. 
6 Mark Thornton, and Robert Ekelund, Jr. Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation: The 
Economics o/the Civil War (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2004), 13. 
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York, Boston, Charleston, New Orleans, Mobile, and Apalachicola contributed 
significantly more to federal coffers than the average U.S. city because of the volume 
of commerce received at their ports. Indirectly, interior states contributed to these 
taxes as well, paying higher prices on goods to eventually caver the tax liability of 
importers. 
An effective lobby by American industry produced legislation to increase 
tariffs on imported goods. These duties drove up the final retail prices of foreign 
goods, thereby lowering the demand. This effect of revenue tariffs created a market 
distorting motivation to tax for other purposes. )fimported goods are made more 
expensive, the demand for local and domestic products will increase and those 
ind ustries will be, in essence, "protected." A protective tariff, then, is one imposed 
beyond what is necessary to generate maximum revenue and serves a secondary 
purpose of giving national industry a leg-up over foreign competition. Domestic 
manufacturers can then raise prices without an increase in costs, a llowing for more 
employment and greater profits at the expense of the consumer.' Henry Clay 
believed a sensible protective tariff would unify the interests of the nation, creating 
a market in northeastern textile firms for southern cotton.a But the manufacture of 
finished goods was primarily a northern endeavor, and the industria l region of New 
England experienced the benefit of protective legislation. 
The added cost through the tariff of imported goods increased the demand in 
the North for domestically produced manufactures, which fostered the growth of 
' Ibid., 14. 
8 Marc Egnal, Clash of Extremes: The Economic Origins of the Civil War (New York: 
Hill and Wang. 2009), 33. 
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northern industries. The cotton South, a cash-poor society, was connected to 
European manufacturing through its cotton factors, who sold the crop in exchange 
for goods unavailable in the local economy.9 The South, as a consumer of 
manufactured goods, was forced to pay higher prices (typically in the currency of 
cotton) for goods received from the proceeds of cotton shipments. Simply put, it 
took more cotton to buy European goods as a result of the tariff, reducing the 
amount of wealth flowing into southern ports. Having little industrial production of 
their own, southern ports exported primarily agricultural products and were 
dependent on northern and European production of manufactured goods, to In 
addition, southern coastal cities' leaders feared protective tariffs imposed by the 
United States would result in retaliatory tariffs on cotton being shipped from the 
South, lowering the demand for their chief export. 11 Therefore, protective tariffs 
benefitted the North while reducing the potential wealth of the South, as these 
economically disparate regions unequally shared the tax burden. 
Congressional attempts to protect burgeoning American industry through 
the application of protective tariffs widened the economic gap separating the North 
and the South. The Tariff of 1828, known in the South as the Tariff of Abominations, 
raised import duties significantly for protective pu rposes. To southern states, these 
rates were an outrage, one not adequately ameliorated by a reduction in the Tariff of 
9 John Boles, The South Through Time: A History of on American Region (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), 190. 
10 Thornton and Ekelund, Jr., Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation, 16. 
11 John L. Conger "South Carolina and the Early Tariffs," The Mississippi Volley 
Historical Review 5:4 (March 1919): 424. 
11 
1832.12 South Carolina responded to the tariff by declaring it null and void, 
threatening the perpetuity of the Union if states could decide which federal laws 
they chose to obey. The Compromise Tariff of 1833 weakly stitched toge ther a 
fragile nation spli t along sectional lines,13 Congress reduced the high protective 
tariffs of 1832 by the compromise over the cou rse of the next ten years. By 1842, 
northern industry was again clamoring with su pport for an increase in protective 
tariffs. 14 Luckily for the North, this coincided with the ascension of the Wh ig Party 
to the presidency in the form of Wi lliam Henry Harri son (very briefly) and John 
Tyler to support the so· called Black Tariff, raising import duties to their 1832 levels. 
Southern states lacked the congressional representation to effectively 
legislate for their ports. The sectional votes simply did not exist in the South to 
strike back until the makeup of the House of Representatives was al tered. 
Representative Joshua R. Giddings of Ohio warned of the pending entry of Texas to 
the Union, pleading with his fellow congressmen, "Are the liberty loving democrats 
of Pennsylvania ready to give up the tariff to strike off all protection .. .in order to 
purchase a slave market for their neighbors?"ls Giddings's warnings that the 
surrender of the balance of political power to the South would surrender the tariff 
went unheeded16, as the admission of Texas in 1846 was instrumental in passing the 
12 Taussig, The Tariff History o[the United States, Partl, 14. 
13 Taussig, The Tariff History o[ the United States, Partl, 32; Thornton and Ekelund, 
Jr., Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation, 22. 
14 Taussig, The Tariff History o[the United States, Part 1,69. 
IS Norman A. Graebner, Politics and the Crisis of 1860 (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1961), 10. 
\6 Calore, The Causes o[the Civil War, 12 5. 
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legislation that would reverse the tariffs. The addition of a slave state strengthened 
congressional representation in opposition to protective tariff increases. 
Southern tariff reformers welcomed the election of James K. Polk, who signed 
into law the Walker Tariff, effectively reversing the high rates of the earlier Black 
Tariff. l 1 The see·saw of ta riff rates was far from over. The Panic of 1857, following 
massive tariff reductions of that same year, gave protectionists fuel for their 
arguments that high import duties were necessary to preserve American jobs and, 
by extension, promote aggregate demand for goods and services. IS The emerging 
Republican Party supported U.S. industry and a high protective ta riff. With gains in 
Congress in 1858 and the pivotal Presiden tial election fast approachin~ the writing 
was on the wall fo r the return of higher import duties. 
By 1860, pending tariff legislation left the state of Florida with an incentive to 
secede. Though tariffs were not as high as pre·1857 levels, the duties were 
nonetheless cumbersome to sh ippers, wholesalers, retailers, a nd consumers alike. 
With the election of Abraham Lincoln in November, Florida businessmen feared a 
return to high protective tariffs. These tariffs had growing importance to Floridians, 
as commercial hubs of activity had developed along Florida's Gulf Coast. The cotton 
of Alabama, Mississippi, and western Georgia was reliant on Gulf Coast port cities to 
fi nd national and international markets. Business leaders in North Florida 
attempted to divert a share of cotton traffic their direction to capitalize on this 
trade. Apalachicola grew la rger earlier, but was surpassed by Pensacola 's deep 
17 Taussig, The TarijJHistary a/the United States, Port 1,71. 
IB Thomas Pitkin, "Western Republicans and the Tariffin 1860," The Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review 27:3 (December 1940): 401. 
13 
harbor and better access to banking capital.19 As Florida's agricultural output 
increased with additional white settlers and slave laborers in the decades following 
its statehood, so did the importance of its coastal cities in delivering these goods to 
pOints north and west. 
Population of Florida (Free and EnslavedJ20 
1840 54,447 
1850 87,445 
1860 140,424 
1870 187,748 
1880 269,493 
1890 391,422 
Florida and other southern states with port cities grew in population and 
demand for imported goods. This represented a potentially enormous source of 
revenue for the federal government. In the midst of the secession crisis, Congress 
debated authorizing of the Morrill Tariff Act, which would effectively raise duties at 
all ports loyal to the U.S. government It garnered the support of President-Elect 
Lincoln, who vowed he would sign the legislation if sent to his desk. 21 This was no 
surprise to the South, as the very convention in Chicago that nominated Abraham 
Lincoln as the Republican presidential candidate had also endorsed a platform 
calling for a program of protective tariffs and internal improvementsP In fact, the 
Chicago Journal in 1858 had argued that protectionist policies would promote 
commercial development in the United States thanks to the efforts of "Tariff men, 
19 Willoughby, Fair to Midlin', 83. 
20 U.S. Census Bureau, Census Material from 1840 to 1890, Historical Census 
Browser. 
21 Harold Holzer, Lincoln, President-Elect (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 328. 
22 John E. Johns, Florida During the Civil War (Gainesville: University of Florida 
Press, 1963), 8. 
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like Abraham Lincoln." Just a month prior to Lincoln's election, he acknowledged his 
well·known history of standing with the Whig party in favor of "ampJe protection to 
American industry" in the form of a tariff.23 
Thus, the South's opposition to Lincoln's ascension to the presidency was not 
only an over·reaction to his anti-slavery platform, but also in response to his new 
party's position on protective tariffs. Lincoln had clearly stated his in tention before 
and upon taking office to not "interfe re with the institution of slavery where it 
exists." 24 Though he viewed slavery to be wrong,25 Lincoln's acknowledged threat 
to southern interest came in his support of the tariff. Ominously, he stated in his 
inaugural add ress that invasion or the use of force would be relied upon in order to 
"collect the duties and imposts."26 Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio declared 
protectionism to be one of the three basic tenets of Republicanism, a long with 
opposition to the extension of slave ry and the support of free homesteadsP The 
South could not be sure what actions Republicans would take towards eventual 
emancipation. The Republican platform on tariffs, however, left little to the 
imagination. 
A rush of orders from the South ensued fo llowing the bill's March 2, 1861 
signing (this pre-dated the Union blockade by six weeks), and northern 
manufacturers and shippers worked overtime to fill the demand before the new 
2l Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutge rs University Press, 1953), IV:125. 
24 Ibid., IV:263. 
2S Ibid., VII :281. 
" Ibid., VII:266. 
27 Pitkin, "Western Republicans and the Tariff in 1860," 404. 
J 
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rates took effect on the first of April. Z8 Southern importers sought to stock up on 
northern goods, believing commercial prices would increase as northern importers 
faced higher duties.29 Fear set in - the fear of financial downturn as significant as 
that the nation had experienced four years prior. The Boston Post estimated some 
$60 million a year in merchandise was being sold and shipped from northern ports 
to southern ports by 1860.30 The financial incentive fo r compromise was massive 
among American businesses. Trade and investment between the regions acted as a 
powerful social adhesive that res isted solu tions rooted in armed conflict. Southern 
merchants had a financial interest in cutting the ties that imposed high import 
duties, but the same business concerns cou ld realize no benefit from armed conflict 
and the inevitable embargo. While a peaceful secession would have benefited 
southern merchants by lowering prices, war simply sh ut down commerce with the 
North. 
As the reality of secession sunk in, New York business went into sleep 
mode.31 The merchant class of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia lamented the 
loss of southern trade as state after state declared its departure from the Union. The 
Morrill Tariff took effect a month after being signed into law, and higher import 
duties became the northern coastal cities' new reality. So for eighteen days, import 
duties were double in the North as compared to the South, as a "War of Tariffs" 
influenced orders for goods on the North American continent. Then, on April 19, 
28 Kenneth Stampp, And The War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 1860-
1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), 232. 
"Ibid., 231. 
30Emory Q. Hawk, Economic History o/the South (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1934),392. 
31 Sta mpp, And The War Came, 231. 
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President Abraham Lincoln issued the order to blockade the rebellious southern 
states, and legal trade between ports within the United States and ports within the 
Confederate States ceased, though blockade runners managed to get their share of 
goods in and out of southern ports and the coastline.32 
International respect fo r the blockade was paramount to its success. 
Representative Benjamin Stanton of Ohio, seeking a peaceful resolution to the loss 
of revenue previously collected in the now rebellious states, proposed a repea l of 
the laws that authorized southern ports as points of entry. This would essentially 
inform foreign business that goods could only be received at loyalist ports to the 
North. If the Gulfports were no longer officially accepting foreign shipments, the 
federal government was relieved of the responsibility to collect revenue there.33 For 
this plan to resolve the revenue portion of the cri sis, foreign trading partners would 
have to demonstrate a respect for United States's power that had not been earned as 
yet. Such a weak response would have proved ruinous to the Union, as French and 
British firms could seek trading opportunities with a new nation, one that offered 
much lower import tariffs fo r foreign goods. 
Florida, with its near eighteen hundred miles of coastline, offered established 
and developing port cities for European trading partners to establish new centers of 
commerce. In the absence of an effective blockade of southern ports, the foreign 
powers announced that they would do just that. Lord Lyons, the British minister to 
America, notified the U.S. government that, in accordance with the Treaty of Paris, 
Great Britain would not recognize a blockade unless it was thorough and effectual. 
32 See Chapter Three for details on blockade running. 
33 Stampp, And The War Came, 119. 
--
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Otherwise, the British would feel compelled by competition with her neighbors to 
disregard the blockade and carry on their commerce with southern ports.3" 
As plans for enforcing revenue collection laws were discussed in Washington 
D.C., the escalated import duties signed into law by the outgoing president began to 
take effect. The Morrill Tariff Act of 1861 is a bewildering piece of legislation. It 
was a protective tariff, largely in response to the Panic of 1857, designed by 
northern protectionists to drive up the price of imported goods to promote 
consumption of domestic manufacturing. Though the Act only raised tariff rates 
moderately35, it was ill -timed. At the very moment when moderate southern 
politicians were looking for a reason to remain loyal, an increase in import duties 
added fuel to the mouth of the fire-breathers. The tariff gave seceded states no 
financial incentive to return. Rather, it provided a disincentive. It was motivated by 
economic interests - not for preservation of the Union, but rather for protection of 
northern business. Northern manufacturers and traders by and large preferred in 
descending order: a perpetual and expanding union, a peaceful secession in which 
the South would remain the North's largest trading partner, or war. The exception 
was those businessmen who would benefit from prolonged conflict, the war-
profiteers who stood to gain from milita ry contracts for munitions and supplies. But 
for the most part, option one would be desirable for business, option two 
acceptable, and option three a disaster. 
The Morrill Tariff, approved by the House of Representatives while southern 
representatives remained in the legislative body, provided cover for those 
34The (Tampa) Florida Peninsular, March 23, 1861, 2:2. 
35 Egnal, Clash of Extremes, 248. 
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secessionists unwilling to publicly base their entire argument on preservation of the 
institution of slavery. The bill was passed in the Senate on strictly sectional lines as 
all northern senators voted in favor, and all remaining southern senators opposed. 
As a precursor to the war itself and the issue of slavery, the South demonstrated an 
uncanny ability to bring about through their own actions that which they feared the 
most. Blaming the conflict on tariff concerns, however, diminishes the powerful 
impact of slavery on the national discourse. It is quite possible that "secession did 
not take place because the Morrill Tariffhad gone through Congress, but, at most, 
the Morrill Tariff went through Congress because secession had taken place."36 The 
only chance to defeat the act was in the body of Congress where southern states had 
equal representation, the Senate. Having abandoned that chance, the act was 
financially overwhelming to southern coastal business and was conveniently cited 
as justification for the cause. 
The governor of Florida, Madison Starke Perry,laid out the state 's case for 
secession in an address before the Florida House of Representatives on February 2, 
1861. Citing the "long suffering (endured) under the forms of legislation, and under 
the shield of the Union," Perry compared the state's exodus to the Jews escaping 
bondage in Egypt.37 He complained of the federal government's intent to collect 
revenue from Florida ports by means of force, claiming a clear violation of the 
36 Karl Marx, October 25,1861, in Marx/Engels Collected Works, Vol. 19 (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1964) as found in 
http://www.marxists.ore/archive/marx/works/1861/ys-ciyjl-war/jndex.htm 
(accessed December 8, 2009). 
37 Journal a[the Proceedings a[the Senate a[the General Assembly a[the State a[ 
Florida at the Tenth Session, Begun and Held at the Capitol, in the City a[Tallahassee, 
Monday, November 26,1860 (Tallahassee: Florida Sentinel Office by Hart & 8arefoot, 
1860),250. 
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state's sovereignty.38 Perry made little mention of slavery. Other than referring to 
the opposition as the "non-slaveholding states," his rhetoric was focused on the 
protection of Florida's sovereignty and the financial oppression of the North. 
To make secession less about slavery and more about financial oppression 
would appeal to the European powers that could potentially sway the war in the 
South's favor. Slavery was distasteful to Great Britain and France, having effectively 
disappeared decades prior and brought to an official end in those nations in 1833 
and 1848, respectively. If the argument for secession cou ld be shifted from slavery 
to the financial benefits aftrading more freely and directly with the South, a case 
could be made for Europe to once again become involved in conflict on the American 
continent. As southern appellants of fo reign assistance such as T. Butler King were 
quick to point out, peaceful secession would give European powers a trading 
partner on the Gulfat lower tariffs, which would in turn result in more trade. 
T. Butler King of Georgia believed that such a secession was warranted in 
response to the Morrill Tariff. Southern opponents of the tariff pOinted to the self~ 
feeding nature of protection and lobbying.39 In an 1861 letter to the British 
Parliament appealing for assistance, for example, King argued that as northern 
industry grew, its power to lobby for protectionist policy did as well. This fueled 
further growth, which in turn fueled the ability to push for even more protective 
tariffs. King's central pOint was that 
J8 Ibid. 
39 T. Butler King to Hon. Lord John Russell, 1861, p. 7, found in Item #2778, Reel 91. 
in Confederate Imprints, ed. Marjorie Crandall (New Haven: Research Publication, 
Inc, 1974). 
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the truly astonishing development of manufacturing industry has 
grown up in the Northern States si nce the peace of 1815 under the influence 
of the protective system, which, by imposing high duties on foreign goods, 
operated as a bounty on all domestic fabrics, and gave to Northern 
manufacturers control of the Southern market at an average profit of twenty-
five percent on the sale of their manufactured goods.40 
King gave lip service to the compromise tariffs of 1833 and 1846, which both served 
to mollify sou thern resistance, though he failed to acknowledge the tradeoffs 
involved in exposing U.S. manufacturing to cheaper foreign goodS. 41 
Elected to represent Georgia in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1838, 
King later served under President Taylor as his agent in California and a duty 
collector at the Port of San Francisco. His work experience was evident in the 
lengthy appea l he filed with the British Parliament and the French Republic for 
assista nce, citing a bevy of statistics on imports, exports, and revenue at northern 
and southern ports. King charted the growth in nominal value of the cotton and 
sugar crops in the decade preceding secession. He claimed a 53 percent increase in 
the total value of agricultural products produced in the South from 1850 to 1859. 
During the same timeframe, he cited a $300 million increase in northern goods 
shipped South, along with a $111 million increase in European goods shipped South 
via New York at a 20 percent profit or greater. His point was to demonstrate the 
exploitation of the South by arguing "that the shipping interest of the northern 
States has been built up on the agricultural products of the southern States."42 If the 
southern ports were freed from excessive tariffs on imports, British and French 
man ufacturers would be able to better com pete with American industry for 
40 Ibid. 
41 King to Russell, 3·8. 
"lbid.,9-12. 
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American consumers. Northern newspapers predicted the trade relationships that 
would bring about economic fuin, assured that should the south succeed, "she will 
immediately form commercial alliances with European countries who will readily 
acquiesce in any arrangement which wil l help English manufacturing at the expense 
of New England."" 
King delivered his letter to the fo reign ministers of Great Britain and France, 
hoping to entice foreign intervention on behalf of the Confederacy. His argument of 
mutual economic benefit was insufficient to overpower British objectio n to the 
Confederacy's steadfast devotion to slavery or France's cautious analysis of the costs 
and benefits of intervention. Great Britain was able to large ly replace the American 
cotton crop lost with the blockade of southern ports by turning to Egyptian cotton, 
but King pointed to the opportunity cost of not capitalizing on millions of consumers 
in America's South by aiding in the rebellion .'!.4 
Likewise, attempts to appeal to European powers with moral outrage over 
the ta riff question produced no significant resu lt. Representative John Reagan of 
Texas decried in early 1861 that the Union was "not content with the vast mi ll ions of 
"tribute" (paid) annually under the operation of our revenue law ... and by making 
(the North) our manufacturers, our merchants, our shippers."45 The words "tribute" 
and "bounties" were highly inflammatory in the nineteenth-century western world. 
As Barbary pirates off t he coast of North Africa harassed American, British, and 
4l Boston Herald, November 12, 1860 . 
.. King to Russell, 7, 8. 
45 Speech of Representative John Reagan of Texas, January 15, 1861, Congressional 
Globe, in The Causes a/the Civil War, ed. Kenneth Stampp, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall,lnc., 1974), 66. 
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French shipping concerns in the Mediterranean for much of the previous century, 
the practice of paying "tribute" or "bounties" to hostile forces as a form of protection 
payment became commonplace.46 The European powers bided their time, 
eventually sending observers and limited financial aid, but never offering their full 
weight of support. 
The repudiation of the Union tariff through secession was not meant to 
suggest that the new nation would impose no duty on foreign imports. Though the 
Finance Committee at Florida's secession convention recommended the sale of 
treasury notes as the "least objectionable of all the methods that have been 
suggested" for raising revenue, port cities were too valuable to ignore as a source of 
tax collection.47 The southern Confederacy had enacted their own tariff to take 
effect on all goods bought after March 1, 1861. The promise of "Free Trade with all 
the world," appearing in releases from the Associated Press, was never seriously 
endorsed.48 The secessionist leadership knew the importance of their ports to raise 
the necessary revenue to maintain even a decentralized confederation of states. 
Without possession of western territories, the Confederacy could not rely on the 
sale of public lands to supplement their operating budget to the extent that the 
United States could. Regardless, this source of revenue did not amount to much in 
comparison to customs duties, which had represented the lion's share of federal 
46 Richard Zacks, The Pirate Coast: Thomas Jefferson, the First Marines, and the Secret 
Mission of 1805 (New York: Hyperion, 2005), 100, 109. 
47 Journal of the Proceeding of the Convention of the People of Florida, 8egun and Held 
at the Capitolin the City of Tallahassee an Thursday, January 3, A.D. 1861 
(Tallahassee: Office of the Floridian and Journal. Dyke & Carlisle, 1861), 92. 
48 McGuire & Van Cott, "The Confederate Constitution, Tariffs, and the Laffer 
Relationship," 427. 
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revenue in the years preceding secession. From 1856 through 1860, the United 
States collected $299,228,268 in total revenue. Of th is, $272,294,765 was in the 
fo rm of cllstoms duties, the rest from the sale of public lands and miscellaneous 
items.49 
Before hostilities began, the Confederate Secretary of the Treasury expected 
to raise in excess of$25 million from import duties in 1861 alone.5o The ability to 
levy taxes was written into the Confederate Constitution. The frame rs deliberately 
made sure that revenue tariffs were allowed, and protective tariffs were not. As 
suggested by historical economists Robert McGuire and Norman Van Cott" 
delegates to the Confederate Constitutional Convention sought to maximize revenue 
collection without unduly restricting trade opportunities. This reflected an 
understanding of taxation principles that had not yet been clearly articulated as the 
Laffer Curve (ci rca 1974), that increasing taxes beyond a certain point work to 
decrease revenue: 
49 Bureau of Statistics, U.S. Department of Treasury. Imports and Exports o/the 
United States, 1835-1898; And Receipts and Expenditures o/the United States 
Government, 1856-1898 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1898), 13. 
so McGuire & Van Cott,"The Confederate Constitu tion, Tariffs, and the Laffer 
Relationship," 429. 
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Fig. 1.1. The Laffer Curve, demonstrating the relationship between tax rates and 
potential revenue. 
If Points A and B generated the same amount of tax revenue, the Confederate 
government constitutionally preferred tariff rates at Point A. As consumers of 
imported goods and not producers of domestic alternatives to those goods, there 
was no incentive for the Confederate government to tax beyond the maximum 
revenue rate. As import tariff rates increase, government revenue increases, and 
prices on imported goods increase. This occurs up to a certain point, when demand 
is adversely affected by increasing prices to the extent that government revenue 
actually starts to drop. The only benefit of increasing tariffs beyond the eqUilibrium 
point is the protection of domestic industry. Tariffs above the equilibrium rate are 
protective in nature as they do not maximize revenue but have the effect of raising 
prices of foreign goods. Florida secessionists sought to operate near pOint A of the 
Laffer curve, drastically reducing tariffs to lower retail prices and benefit the state 
commercial shipping industry. As demonstrated by the Morrill Tariff, the northern 
25 
Republican goal was to operate closer to Point B of the Laffer Curve, which yielded 
greater protection of domestic industry at the expense of government revenue. The 
outbreak of hostilities required the Confederate government to pursue higher 
revenues at the expense of free trade policy, pushing towards equilibrium but not 
beyond it. McGuire and Van Cott argue that the Confederate Constitution expressly 
forbade protective tariffs. 
The Congress shall have power-
To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, for 
revenue necessary to pay the debts, provide for the common defense, 
and carry on the Government of the Confederate States; but no 
bounties shall be granted from the treasury; nor shall any duties or 
taxes on importations from foreign nations be laid to promote or 
foster any branch of industry 51 
Whereas the U.S. Constitution contains no such explicit denunciation of protective 
tariffs, the Confederate Constitution specifically proscribes such policy. As such, the 
Confederate Constitution limited tariffs to the lower end of the Laffer Curve. 
Secessionist leaders in Florida did the same, placing a provision in the new state 
constitution prohibiting taxes greater "than may be required for the necessary 
expenses of government."S2 
McGuire and Van Cott '5 conclusion, that the constitutional language suggests 
"the tariff issue may in fact have been even more important in the ... tensions that led 
to the Civil War than many economists and historians currently believe,"s3 gave 
added significance to the busy ports of Florida's Gulf Coast in determining the state's 
51 C.S.A. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, cI. 1. 
52 Florida Consitution of 1861, art. 8, sec. 2. 
53 McGuire & Van Cott, "The Confederate Constitution, Tariffs, and the Laffer 
Relationship," 437. 
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allegiance. In fact, the very first substantive ordinance passed by the Tallahassee 
Convention in January 1861 was a declaration of intent to not pay further import 
tariffs to the United States government. Ordinance No.2 stated clearly "that no 
duties shall be collected upon imports from the states forming the late Federal 
Union."S4 Florida put its priorities up front, stating implicitly that the state's 
secession was rooted in the tariff issue. The United States government had been 
willing to sacrifice some government revenue at southern ports to achieve 
protectionist goals for northern industry as maximum revenue collection would 
have occurred at lower rates. Florida had no vested interest in such a sacrifice. 
Florida's secession contributed to federal deficit spending in both ways 
imaginable: a need for increased federal spending to protect and defend the 
remaining garrisons on the state and blockade the eighteen hundred miles of 
coastline, coupled with a loss of federal tax revenue at high-traffic ports like 
Pensacola and Apalachicola. The loss of Florida ports proved a drain on a federal 
government already stretched beyond its limited framework. As the secession 
winter progressed and more states left the Union, federal collection of revenues 
dropped off. Customs revenue collected nationwide by the federal government 
dropped from $53,187,511 in 1860 to $39,582,125 in 1861.ss In an attempt, to 
maintain a flow of tax revenue from Florida's ports despite the state's secession, the 
southern abolitionist and soon-to-be Minister to Russia Cassius Clay suggested in 
February 1861 to merely continue enforcing the law by stationing revenue 
54 Journal o[the Proceedings o[the Convention o[the People o[Florida, 110. 
ss Bureau of Statistics, Imports and Exports o[the United States, 1835·1898, 13. 
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collectors off the coast of southern ports.56 However, Florida's secession ordinances 
expressly forbade these payments to be made. If the federal government wanted to 
collect their duties, they would have to do so by force. 
The federal government could not allow secession of the state of Florida 
because losing that amount of coastline would make the southern border impossible 
to control. Though the Florida ports provided the nation with a nominal amount of 
tax revenue, the ports provided a point of entry for federa lly taxed foreign goods. At 
the ports, tariff co llection was feasible and smuggling was possible, but difficult. 
Having the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico provide the southern border to the 
United States made it easier to monitor and regulate commerce. Secession would 
create a more difficu lt to recognize southern land border for apprOXimately two 
thousand miles, allowing fo r easy flow of tax-free goods into the North. The loss of 
Atlantic and Gul f coast southern ports moved the border inland, making it ha rder to 
patrol and undermining northern ports and tariff collection. The loss of Florida's 
eighteen hundred miles of coastline represented just over half of the coastline lost 
to the United States wi th the secession of the southern states. The London Times 
reported European merchants speaking openly about the possibilities to expand 
sales into northern U.S. markets because of the potential inabi lity to enforce tariffs 
on goods trickling across this political boundary. 57 This presented a clear threat to 
northern industry and the collection of tariffs in northern ports. If European 
shippers knew they could deliver a product to all southern, western, and eventually 
56 Cassius Clay to John A. Andrew, February 18, 1861, John A. Andrew Papers, 
Massachusetts Historical Society in And The War Came, Stampp" 40. 
S7 Stampp, And the War Ca me, 233. 
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northeasterrn American consumers at greatly reduced tariff rates, there would be 
little incentive to maintain their shipping levels to Boston and New York, thus 
stripping the federal government of its main source of revenue. 58 
The loss of control over commerce within the nation and with Europe on the 
American continent posed an unacceptable financial risk to New England industry. 
The regional sovereignty gained through secession allowed Gulf Coast ports to 
cha rge protective tariffs on northern goods and to charge export taxes on cotton 
shipped to northern manufacturers. Because textile operators in the North were 
reliant on the southern climate and soil, the potential taxes could not be avoided by 
regional se lf-sufficiency. The North could not simply grow their own staple crops. 
The Boston Herald predicted in November 1860 the ramifications of successful 
secession: 
Should the South succeed in carrying out her designs, she will 
immediately form commercial alliances with European countries who 
will readily acquiesce in any arra ngement which will help English 
manufacturing at the expense of New England. The first move the 
South would make would be to impose a heavy tax upon the 
manufacturers of the North, a nd an export tax upon the cotton used 
by Northern manufacturers. In this way she would seek to cripple the 
North. The carrying trade, which is now done by American vessels, 
wou ld be transferred to British ships, which would be a heavy blow 
aimed at our commerce. It will also seriously affect our shoe trade 
and the manufactu re of ready·made clothing, wh ile it would derange 
the monetary affai rs of the country.59 
Clea rly, the northern newspapers feared retaliatory tariffs on raw materials. This 
would give Florida ports the ability to place export tariffs on cotton shipped from 
Apalachicola bound for textile mills in New York. If the Confederacy were successful 
58 Bray Hammond, Sovereignty and an Empty Purse; Banks and Politics in the Civil 
War (Princeton: Princeton Univers ity Press, 1970), 48. 
59 Boston Herald, November 12, 1860. 
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in establishing a separate sovereign nation, control of intra· conti nental commerce 
would shift from one unified power to two divided interests. Northern industry 
would be threatened if Confederate export tariffs on raw materials drove up the 
price of American textiles in comparison to imported goods more so than the 
protective tariffs could compensate for. The Union could not allow this to happen. 
Duty collection records for Florida ports prior to the Civil War are 
unavailable. But, ten years after the cessation of hostilities, approximate ly three 
hundred thousand dollars in duties were collected in the Florida Customs districts.60 
This figure was staggering to the small, backwoods state of Florida in 1875, 
representing 12 percent of the entire value of goods produced in the state in 1860 
($2,447,969) before the devastation wrought by war." Bya quarter of a century 
after the war, over a million dollars annually was collected from these ports.62 
The ports of Apalachicola, Pensacola, and Tampa dominated the state's Gulf 
Coast shipping in volume throughout the decades preceding the Civil War. 
Apalach icola's two lighthouses served as a beacon for commercial ships to p ly their 
wares in the cosmopolitan frontier city. In addition to the seasonal population of 
the Gulf port, customers could be found inland along the longest and largest r iver 
system in the Southeast, conveniently opening onto Apalachicola Bay. The 
Chattahooche/Apalachicola/Chipola/Flint river system penetrated deep into the 
60 Charles H. Evans, camp., Imports and Exports. Part I. Imports/rom 1867 to 1893 
inclusive, a compilation offoreign commodities imported and entered for consumption 
in the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1894),964. 
61 U.S. Census Bureau, Census Material from 1840 to 1890, Historical Census 
Browser. 
62 Evans, Imports and Exports. Part I, 964. 
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cotton rich regions of Georgia and Alabama. Despite the inviting conditions, 
Apalachicola returned disappointing levels of revenue to federal coffers during its 
golden age of shipping in the 18405 as exporting cotton took precedence over 
importing goods ofvalue.63 This was surprising given the nature of the shipping 
industry. For oceanic commerce to be profitable, ships must be able to deliver 
product on both legs of a journey. An empty ship at sea for months returning home 
dilutes whatever profit was made on the initial trek In 1842-43, Apalachicola 
loaded up over $3 million dollars worth of cotton but only unloaded $44,771 in 
imports from those ships.64 The ships could not travel empty. They required ballast 
to sail properly and were loaded with cheap potatoes, salt, and hay when inbound 
for Apalachicola.6s 
As the Gulf Coast grew in population after Florida achieved statehood in 
1845, the quantity and value of imported goods increased at a similar rate. The 
population of Florida more than doubled from 1870 to 1890, and this can be seen in 
the growing amount of dutiable goods imported to Florida during that time period. 
63 Willoughby, Fair to Middlin', 43. 
'"'Ibid. 
os Ibid., 47. 
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Fig. 1.2. "Table of Receipts and Expenses. Florida, 1874·1893," in Imports and 
Exports, Part /, compo Evans, 964. 
Relatively speaking. these numbers were Significant in comparison to other 
southern states. In 1874, Florida's $233,852 in co llected duty compared nicely to 
Texas' $313,700. Ayear later. Florida collected $299,921. su rpassing Texas in 
duties collected by $87,642. No other former Confederate state, aside from 
Louisiana, collected as much federal tax revenue through the importation of goods 
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during this time period. Florida's nearest competitors in port duties in the South in 
1875 were South Carolina with $114,262 and Georgia at $61,11966 
As a source of revenue at this pOint in history, however, Florida was only 
significant to the Union's treasury in comparison to other southern and smaller 
states. Collections in Florida in 1874 ran about 10 percent of Louisiana's 
($2,259,665), about 3 percent of California's ($7,713,108), and only .2 percent of 
New York's ($111,652,125)." 
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Florida's import tax revenue was much greater than or competitive with all 
but the largest commerce states (California, Louisiana, Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
and Maryland).68 Combining all southern port revenue together and returning it to 
regular treasury collections, the effect of reunification can be seen immediately 
following the conclusion of the war. Total customs duties collected more than 
doubled the year after the war, climbing fro m $84,928,260 to $179,046,63169 due to 
resumption of civilized commerce and the return of Southern ports to federal tax 
rolls. Though Florida tax revenue would be important to the federa l government in 
the postwar years, it was dwarfed by the massive port collections at New York City 
to the point of insignificance. Florida's importance to the Union was not in the 
amount of revenue generated by its ports, but rather in the control of those ports as 
paints of entry to commerce on the continent Flor ida's posi tion in the global 
network of commerce came as an exporter of goods, providing the wares that were 
shipped to Europe on the western leg of voyages that brought manufactured goods 
into American ports. Without the exportation of cotton from Florida ports, 
transatlantic shipping would not have been nearly as profitable or commonplace, 
thus reducing the total amount of import duties collected at all U.S. ports. 
Florida's decision to secede was motivated in part by a desire to expand 
import operations without paying the accompanying higher tariffs. If secession 
were successful, Florida's lower ta r iffs would encourage European exporte rs to 
make use of the state's vast coastline, especially as the population grew. Florida's 
68 S. Doc. No. 259, 53" Cong., 20 ' Sess. (1898). 
69 Bureau of Statistics, Imports and Exports a/the United States, 1835-1898, 13. 
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ports, however, were vital to protection of import duties to the United States. 
Though they were all but insignificant in terms of the dollar value of import tariffs 
collected, the state was prized by the Union and the emerging Confederacy for its 
potential to receive goods at any number of port cities and utilize the growing 
transportation network to finish delivery. With Florida's secession, the South 
gained an abundance of port cities from which they could potentially import goods. 
The North lost control of over half of the eventual Confederacy's coastline with 
Florida's secession, which threatened their very ability to continue to effectively 
regulate the entry of foreign goods onto the continent and tax for both revenue and 
protectionist purposes. For this reason, the United States government could not 
acquiesce and allow the secession of Florida. 
:> 
Pensacola 
Apalachicola 
35 
Fe andina 
Fig. 2.1. Principal sites for cotton exportation in Florida, circa 1860. Map by author. 
Chapter 2 
Florida in the Court of King Cotton 
Florida's ports were important not only for the protection of import duties, but also 
as a potential exporter of the country's most significant commodity. In the 
antebellum South, cotton was king in terms of volume and dollar value of exported 
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goods, representing more wealth than all other American exports combined.1 
Cotton's importance was huge already, and on the upswing as the southern states 
pondered secession.2 Florida, as an actor and an object in the secession crisis, was 
in a position to take advantage of the growing cotton industry because of Its 
abundant coastline near the heart of cotton country. 
Back in the early nineteenth century. the transatlantic triangular trade that 
had brought slaves to the Americas, raw materials to Eu rope, and rum to Africa 
dramatically shifted and expanded. Two factors contributed to this: the invention 
of the cotton gin in 1793, which exponentially decreased the labor costs associated 
with bringing cotton to market, and legislation intended to halt the slave trade in 
1818.3 As a result, Africa was removed from the triangle and the volume of 
commerce between North America and Europe expanded. A new triangle was 
formed, linking southern agricultural ports with centers of commerce in New York 
and the industrial cities of the Old World. Florida's ports, as exporters of cotton, 
became a part of that triangle in the decades preceding the Civil War, indirectly 
trading their cotton for salt, manufactured goods, and European immigrants paying 
passage on return voyages to America.4 Being part of the triangle meant the ports 
were essentia l to the conflicting interests in the secession crisis that was to follow. 
The ability to ship cotton from Florida's ports influenced the state's decision 
to secede, made the state a valuable addition to the emerging Confederacy, and left 
1 Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth a/the United States: 1790-1860 (New 
York: W.w. Norton & Co., 1966), 68. 
2 Bureau of Statistics, Imports and Exports a/the United States, 1835-1898, 11. 
3 Willoughby, Fair to Middlin; 1. 
'lbid,47. 
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the United States in a vulnerable position for continued global commerce after 
losing the state. Florida's growing reliance on cotton shipments tied its interests to 
an industry run on slave labor. Secession to protect the institution of slavery made 
sense for a state banking on the growth of cotton exportation. If Florida could enter 
into free and open commerce directly with Europe, its potential for profit would 
expand. For the Deep South, Florida's ports presented options for moving the cash 
crop of cotton to foreign markets and importing European goods directly to the 
South. But from the perspective of the United States, the preservation of potential 
points of exit for cotton through Florida ports was vital to the protection of the 
nation's continued economic growth, as this trade funded the wealth of goods 
pouring into the nation. Because of its ports' potential , both as an importer of goods 
and an exporter of cotton, Florida was a prize. 
Florida's location connected the optimal land for growing cotton and the 
open sea required to carry the crop to market Ideal conditions for growing cotton 
were located one to two hundred miles inland, perfect for growing but not for 
shipping,S Cotton could be grown in northeast Florida, but conditions to produce 
maximum yield were ideal just to the northwest in Alabama and Mississippi where a 
particular combination of rainfall patterns. soil conditions, and temperature 
coalesced,6 The cotton-rich states needed Florida and other coastal states as 
conduits to distant markets. Without access to these markets, cotton wealth was 
non-existent. Cotton production at the levels seen after 1795 was, by definition, for 
5 Gavin Wright, The Political Economy olthe Cotton South (New York: w.w. Norton, 
& Co., 1978), 14. 
6 Ibid. 
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cash crop purposes. The only reason to produce cotton in high volume was to get it 
out and to market. Profit-minded inland planters sought the optimal ports from 
which to ship their product based on proximity and accessibility via rail or river. 
Florida provided these planters with a viable option for the shipment of cotton. 
Because of the ease of access, geographic location alone wou ld suggest the 
most ideal points of exit for cotton to be shipped from the continent to be New 
Orleans, Mobile, Apalachicola, Charleston, and Savannah. New Orleans had the 
advantage of a shipping infrastructure that pre-dated the explosion of cotton 
production and the creation of the United States. Neighboring Mobile was in close 
proximity to the heart of cotton production and linked to the production fields 
through the Alabama and Tombigbee rivers? Apalachicola offered a port connected 
to the largest and longest river system in the southeastern United States, one that 
ran directly through the richest cotton fields in America.8 The ports of Charleston 
and Savannah were very much to the east of the Cotton Belt, but were on the 
Atlantic side of Florida, creating easier shipping routes to England and New York or 
Boston that would bypass the navigational dangers of the Florida coast and 
Caribbean islands.9 The port cities of Galveston and Pensacola added to the already 
crowded field of choices, each with their own advantages and disadvantages, 
demonstrating the competitive nature of the antebellum cotton sh ipping business. 
Because of the proximity of Florida's northern ports to areas of concentrated cotton 
7 Willoughby, Fair to Middlin ', 121; Wright, The Political Economy a/the Cotton South, 
14. 
8 Florida Bureau of Land and Water Management, The Apalachicola River and Bay 
System: A Florida Resource (Tallahassee: F.B.I. W.M., 1977), 1. 
' Willoughby, Fair to Middlin', 124; Wright, The Political Economy o[the Cotton South, 
16, 
.J 
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production, the state offered options to planters seeking to transport their product 
to northern and European manufacturers. 
Thus, the cotton industry had a variety of choices when it came to exporting 
its product. In the event any southern ports were lost to the nation, business 
interests would shift exportation to those ports where they could escape regulation 
or enemy interference. If no shipping were allowed out of American ports, cotton 
planters would seek the nearest non·American ports to send their product to 
market A precedent had already been set to utilize Florida ports for the exportation 
of American cotton in the years before Florida had been annexed by the United 
States. As early as 1805, Fernandina exported 77,000 pounds of cotton. When 
President Jefferson imposed the poorly constructed Embargo Act of 1807, an 
isolationist policy to eliminate all foreign trade, American cotton planters and 
British shipping interests utilized Fernandina as a port of exit to evade the harsh 
restrictions.10 The eventual secession of Florida, therefore, presented to seceding 
cotton states an option for transporting the ir products to market, doubling the 
Confederacy's accessib le coastline. 
Florida's port city of Apalachicola was the young state's chief site of cotton 
exportation in the antebellum years.ll Apalachicola's prominence as a center of 
commerce was on the rise, as cotton exports flowed from the port city to England 
and France and modest shipments of consumer goods were received in return from 
10 Paul E. Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2002),255. 
II Christopher E. Horrell, "Plying the Waters of Time: Maritime Archaeology and 
History on the Florida Gulf Coast" (PhD diss., Florida State University, 2005), 54 . 
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Europe.12 Apalachicola's prospects for a profitable future were strong enough that 
in 1843, its leaders sought a loan secured by potentia) future earnings from the U.S. 
House of Representatives to expand port operations and make harbor 
improvements.13 As the third largest exporter of cotton in the nation during the 
18405, the port city on Florida's panhandle held great promise for future growth. 14 
Apalachicola served as a nexus between South and North, and between 
America and Europe, connecting the agricultural regions of the nation's southern 
frontier to the port of New York, the textile mills of New England, and the European 
financing and retail markets. IS Cotton exports peaked in Apalachicola during the 
1840s, reaching a value of$3,068,500 during the 1842-1843 season.'6 
Entrepreneurs saw the potential profit in exporting cotton from Florida and 
invested heavily in establishing competition for Apalachicola. The Lake Wimico & 
St Joseph's Canal and Railroad Company's establishment of Port St Joe, only twenty 
miles to the northwest, threatened Apalachicola's dominance as Florida's chief 
cotton exporter. 17 St.Joe's deep harbor and railroad connection offered a more 
efficient and consistent operation than steamboat transportation of cotton to the 
GutfCoast. But a yellow fever outbreak in the early 1840s left St. Joe abandoned and 
1Z Willoughby, Fair to Middlin', 40,43. 
\3 H,R. Doc. No. 279, 17'" Congress, 3d Sess., (February 23, 1843) . 
.. Willoughby, Fair to Middlin ', 1l. 
IS Ibid ., 6-7. 
16 Ibid., 43. 
17 Horrell, "Plying the Waters of Tirne", 54. 
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Apalachicola the primary cotton port in the state ofFlorida.18 This allowed 
Apalachicola to prosper and concentrate on the expanding cotton trade.l9 
The exportation of cotton was the driving force in the United States' 
economic growth during the first half of the nineteenth century. The rapid growth 
of manufacturing that defined mid-nineteenth century America was funded in large 
part by proceeds from the sale of cotton to British and French markets. As Albert 
Bolles wrote in 1879, cotton was "as characteristic a product of [the United States] 
as spices are of the Indies, or tea of China, but vastly more precious."2o From 1815 
to 1860, cotton accounted for over half of the value of U.S. exports.21 U.S. exports 
grew steadily during this period, especially in the period between 1844 and 1860 
when annual exports increased from $105,745,832 to $333,576,057.22 That year, 
cotton exports valued at $191,806,555 accounted for 57 percent of all exports.23 
The cotton trade set the trend for U.S. exports as a whole. 
18 Ibid . 
,9 Willoughby, Fair to Middlin', 42. 
20 Albert BoHes, The Industrial History of the United States from the Earliest 
Settlements to the Present Time: Being a Complete Survey of American Industries 
(Norwich, Connecticut: The Henry Bill Publishing Company, 1879), 46. 
2! North, The Economic Growth of the United States, 68. 
22 Bureau of Statistics, Imports and Exports of the United States, 1835-1898, 11. 
2l Stuart Bruchey, ed., Cotton and the Growth of the American Economy, 1790-1860 
(Atlanta: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1967), Table K. 
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Cotton exports were valued by the North not only for the profits to be made 
financing, insuring. and shippi ng southern cotton, but also because they created a 
demand for cargo vessels heading east to England and France. Profitable shipments 
to the Old World meant reduced shipping costs and therefore greater imports back 
to the United States. These imports. however, were directed at northern ports 
where actual demand existed. The lower aggregate demand for fo reign imports in 
southern ports as compared to northern cities was a resu lt of smaller populations, 
lower per capita income, and less developed transportation infrastructure. 
43 
Therefore, a triangular trade existed in which southern cotton purchased European 
goods bound for northern markets. Ships returning from cotton runs to England 
filled their cargo holds with manufactured goods that could not be made as cheaply 
and efficiently in the United States and with European immigrants seeking 
opportunities in the United States.24 Thus, cotton shipments from southern ports 
were inextricably linked to the importation of European goods to the United States. 
As a result of the cotton trade, wealth poured into the young nation, 
enriching planters, shippers, insurers, financiers, speculators, merchants, cotton 
factors. and dock workers alike. As just one example, virtually everyone in and 
around Apalachicola throughout the 18405 and 18505 made their living directly 
from cotton.25 Commerce distributed this wealth, as those associated with the 
cotton industry saw their purchasing power increase and were able to fund the 
development of other industries through their purchase of goods and services. 
Nationally, the value of U.S. imports highly correlated with the value of cotton 
exports, as cotton profits were turned around to purchase imported European 
goods and to fund the development of industry in the northeastern United States. A 
comparison of Figures 2.2 and 2.3 shows the similar trends in import and cotton 
export values from 1815 to 1860. The wealth created by cotton was exchanged in 
Europe for valuable goods, raising the average standard of living in the United 
States. 
24 H. Owens, "Apalachicola before 1861" (PhD diss., Florida State University,1966), 
224-225. 
2S Willoughby, Foir to Middlin', 30. 
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Therefore, on a national scale, northern commerce was dependent on the 
southern cotton trade. The northern shipping and shipbuilding industries grew 
44 
because of the ability to ship a product grown exclusively in the South. Likewise. in 
a symbiotic relationship, the growing cotton industry was dependent on northern 
shippi ng and capital inves tments. Cotton was the primary cash crop of the southern 
states. The volume of cotton increased from 870,415 bales in 1830 to 4.5 mi llion 
bales in 1859, while the North's shipping tonnage matched like a balance sheet 
during the same period : 872,578 tons increasing to 4.48 million.26 T. Butler King's 
1861 letter to Parliament requesting British recognition and assista nce framed the 
Confederate argument of the persistent exploitation of cotton producing states for 
26 King to Russell, 12. 
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northern gain. According to King, the cotton flowing out of southern ports created 
the wealth of the North, while it should have been the cotton states that were 
profiting: 
When we consider that... the Northern States were almost destitute of 
agricultural products for exportation ... we can readily perceive the 
causes which have produced the great accumulation of wealth in the 
Northern section of the Union. It has been shown that through the 
instrumentality of that system the Northern states have secured to 
themselves great profits on all branches of their industry, and the 
entire monopoly of Southern commerce, both foreign and domestic. 27 
The mayor of Apalachicola expressed similar concerns over the necessity of 
northern involvement in the cotton trade when he petitioned the Florida House of 
Representatives in 1860 for public investment in harbor improvements.28 Citing 
Apalachicola's $3.2 million in cotton exports over the preceding twenty months and 
its meager thirty·three thousand dollars in foreign imports over that sa me time 
period, Mayor Samuel Benezet questioned the logic of routing cotton exports 
through New York and depending on northern ports as the centers of commerce: 
Why not save all those Northern expenses and build up Southern 
cities instead of Northern? We have shipped over three millions and a 
quarter to Europe, a large portion of it will be worked up and shipped 
to the North and the people or Florida will go there and buy it. Why 
not ship it back to Apalachicola and buy it there instead of at New 
York? This can be done and we have the capital at Apalachicola to do 
it...29 
Throughout the 1850s, more than half of the cotton exports from Apalachicola were 
routed through the northern ports of New York, Boston, and Providence and less 
"Ibid., 13. 
28 Journal of the Proceedings of the House a/Representatives a/the General Assembly 
of the State of Florida otits Tenth Session, Begun and Held at the Capitol, in the City of 
Tal/ohossee, on Monday, November 26,1860 (Tallahassee: Office orthe Floridian and 
Journal, Dyke & Carlisle, 1860), 14-17. 
" Ibid ., 16. 
J 
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than half were sent directly to European markets.30 But the status quo benefited 
northern financing and shipping interests in a symbiotic relationship with southern 
cotton producers, giving the North an interest in preserving its role in the cotton 
trade. 
This inte rdependent economic arrangement increased the amount of cotton 
that could be sold on the open market. Of those planters who grew cotton in north 
Florida, the overwhelming majo rity relied on commission factor merchants 
operating out of the state's ports and often routing the product through New York. 31 
The long periods of time between harvesting the crop and delivery to manufacturers 
necessitated an investment of capital to keep the planters well suppJied.J2 In the 
cash· poor South, that investment had to come from northern capitalists. Without 
northern investment, the South would have been unable to expand cotton 
production to the high levels seen before the war. Because of the South's reliance on 
northern shipping and cotton merchant factors, who marketed the product to 
manufacturers foreign and domestic, northe rn capitalists were able to siphon away 
a share of the wealth being grown on plantations in the South)3 
Though the trade was dependent on a combination of slave labor, southern 
land, and northern financing and shipping34, outspoken secessionists of the cotton 
south, like Mayor Benezet, believed the northern investors and shipping concerns 
30 Willoughby, Fair to Middlin', 40-4l. 
31 Julia Floyd Smith, Slavery and Plantation Growth in Antebellum Florida 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1973), 158. 
n Ibid., 159. 
33 Ibid., 158. 
34 Harold D. Woodman, King Cotton and His Retainers: Financing and Marketing the 
Cotton Crop of the South, 1800-1925 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 
1990),169. 
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were disproportionately benefiting at the expense of the South. Likewise, Senator 
Robert Toombs of Georgia attributed this discrepancy to the monopoly granted to 
U.S. shippi ng concerns that "received higher freights than they could get in open 
competition with the carriers of the world."ls Toombs believed that southern 
dependence on northern shipping distributed too much of the cotton wealth out of 
the states in which it was produced.36 This sense of injury contributed to southern 
calls for secession, as the leaders of the cotton states believed failure to separate 
from the union would bring about financial ruin.37 
Both the North and the South sought to derive maximum benefit possible 
from the international cotton trade. Because cotton exports paid for 60 percent of 
domestic im ports in 186038, they were the indirect source of the majority of 
government tariff revenue. The $333 million in exports that year were offset by 
5353 million in imports.39 From these imports, the federal government raised 
553,187,511 in revenue in 1860. This accounted for 95 percent of all revenue 
collected.40 The expanding federal government used this revenue and then some, 
spending $63 million from mid-1859 to mid-1860 on the War Department, the Navy 
Department, Indians, Pensions, Interest on Public Debt, and other civil and 
miscellaneous items.41 As federal spending skyrocketed during the Civil War, 
postwar tariff revenue became all the more important in order to pay down national 
3S "The Rebellion Record, Supplement: in The Causes o[the Civil War ed. Stampp, 63. 
" Ibid. 
31 Stampp, And the War Came, 136. 
38 Bruchey, ed., Cotton and the Growth of the American Economy, 2. 
39 Bureau of Statistics, Imports and Exports o[the United States, 1835-1898, 11. 
40 Ibid., 13. 
41 Ibid., 14. 
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debt and maintain the expanded role of the government. Without cotton profits to 
fund the imports, the United States government's primary source of income would 
disappear. 
The loss of cotton exports presented a potential fiscal nightmare for the 
United States government, reducing tax revenue at a time of increasing government 
expenditures to quell the rebellion. The loss of one tax resulted in the imposition of 
others. President Lincoln and Congress authorized the nation's first income tax and 
a tax on land and other property in August 1861 to offset the imbalance of revenue 
and spending created by the war. The prevailing policy out of Washington D.C., 
however, was to treat the war 35 an extraordinary experience and to operate at an 
unprecedented deficit in the short run. No serious attempt to generate sufficient tax 
revenue to fight the war was considered.42 A manageable deficit of seven million 
dollars in 1860 climbed to $963 million in the last year of the war.4l Cotton, which 
served as a global currency and directly purchased foreign goods, was vital to the 
nation's long-term goals of paying down this massive debt and balancing future 
budgets. Without cotton, imports would suffer. Without imports, the federal deficit 
would climb. 
Florida's significance to the cotton industry and thus to this larger concern of 
fiscal policy was not as a producer, as the state's 1859-1860 production of 65,153 
bales was miniscule in comparison to the heavyweights of cotton production. That 
42 Bray Hammond, Sovereignty and an Empty Purse: Banks & Politics in the Civil War 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 264. 
4l Bureau of Statistics, "Imports and Exports of the United States, 1835-1898," 3. 
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same period, Mississippi turned out 1,202,507 bales and Alabama 989,955 .... 
Though Florida's cotton production was on the rise, as the figures from 1860 
indicated a 4S percent increase over the previous decade, this was comparable to 
the increases Georgia experienced in the sa me time period.4S Increases by cotton 
powerhouses like Alabama (77 percent), Louisiana (337 percent). and Arkansas 
(464 percent) put Florida's gains in context.46 While cotton production was on the 
rise throughout the South, the substantial growth occurred in the Cotton Belt to 
Florida's north.47 The real contribution Florida could make to the growing industry 
was to connect the South to textile manufacturers through ports of commerce. As 
the map below illustrates, Florida's real contribution to the cotton trade was in its 
proximity to the Cotton Belt and its extensive coastline. 
4. Gilbert File & Jim Reese, eds., An Economic History of the United States (Boston: 
Houghton Mimin Co., 1959), 158. 
4S New York Times, July 6,1883. 
46 Ibid. 
" Wright, The Political Economy o[the Cotton South, 14. 
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Resenting the amount of profit northern business interests were gleaning 
from the cotton crop, southern planters met in Tallahassee in 1851 to discuss a 
cooperative that would build warehouses in southern centers of commerce and take 
over the marketing of cotton to foreign and domestic buyers.48 The "Florida Plan," 
as it was called, was to set a minimum price for cotton that planters would be 
guaranteed by the association if they could not sell for that price on the open 
market. But the South lacked the necessary capital to support such a plan.49 Though 
48 Woodman, King Cotton and His Retainers, 147. 
"Ibid, 
.J 
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it was abandoned, the Florida Plan strengthened southern resolve and fostered a 
sense of unity.SO This dissension formed the basis of economic arguments a decade 
later that augmented southern cries for secession and foreign assistance. 
Florida's future as a cotton exporter was dependent on investment in the 
state's rail infrastructure. Throughout the mid·18S0s, the development of southern 
railroads and growth of competing ports like Mobile and Savannah reduced 
Apalachicola's cotton exports. The total value of cotton exported from Apalachicola 
dropped from $139 million in 1853 to $67 million in 1858.51 As the railroad 
industry in the South grew, cotton was less reliant on the south's river systems for 
transport. Whereas port cities such as New Orleans, Mobile, and Apalachicola had 
once been assured by their connecting river systems a place in the cotton trade, the 
iron horse changed the parameters of the game. Railroads created the opportunity 
for cotton to be routed to new ports, creating a sense of uncertainty in the cotton 
trade. 
In an attempt to lure cotton to their particular markets, Florida cotton 
planters, along with local business interests, built rail lines to Pensacola as had 
previously been attempted at Port St Joe.52 The Macon & Columbus and Central of 
Georgia Railroads diverted cotton traffic away from Apalachicola to Savannah, while 
construction of the Alabama & Florida Railroad threatened to redirect some of 
Mobile's cotton receipts to Pensacola.53 Port cities with dedicated rail lines won out 
so Robert A. Taylor, Rebel Storehouse (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 
1995),6. 
51 Willoughby, Fair to Middlin ; 130. 
52 Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers, 30 1. 
53 Woodman, King Cotton and His Retainers, 88. 
52 
over those with river connections, as seasonal changes and water levels interfered 
with year long shipments to ports fed by rivers. Various Florida ports became the 
victims and beneficiaries of railroad development as the laying of tracks both 
circumvented and connected previously relied upon river connections. 
In 1855, a boom of railroad construction in the Sunshine State gave the Deep 
South more options for exporting its cotton and receiving imports. The Tallahassee 
& St. Marks Road was reconstructed and re-equipped through a combination of 
public and private investment.54 The Florida, Atlantic, & Gulf Central Company laid 
track from Lake City to Jacksonville as the Florida Railroad drew up contracts for a 
line connecting the gulf coast to Fernandina on the Atlantic,55 The Cedar Key to 
Fernandina railroad cut across the state so that ships did not have to navigate 
around the southern tip of Florida and the Keys, the most dangerous portion of the 
trip, when traveling between New Orleans and northeastern harbors. Prospects for 
the state's ports were exceedingly optimistic in the 1850s. As historian Rowland 
Rerick wrote a half century later: 
It was expected that Fernandina would become the great Atlantic city 
of the South for the export of cotton; Tampa Bay the important 
Gulf depot on the line from New York to San Francisco by way of the 
Honduras Railroad, and Pensacola the most favorable city for the 
import of goods for retail merchants of the middle South.56 
Florida was poised to take its position of prominence as a center of commerce. 
54 Rowland H. Rerick & Francis P. Fleming. eds., Memoirs of Florida, Vol. 1 (Atlanta: 
The Southern Historical Association, 1902), 226. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
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As Florida's shipping and transportation industry grew, the South was 
strengthened by the dominant role cotton played in geopolitics. In 1855, David 
King's influential work Cotton is King: or Slavery in the Light of Political Economy 
extolled the importance of cotton to not only the national economy, but the global 
economy as well. Perhaps more important than the arguments presented in the 
book, the title phrase "Cotton is King" and its derivative "King Cotton" both had 
staying power to influence the policies of southern states and the pride and unity of 
the southern culture. The phrases were "soon on every Southern tongue 
and ... became gospel by repetition,"S7 The cotton trade emboldened Southerners to 
take drastic steps towards protecting the institution of slavery that they might 
otherwise have lacked the capital and confidence to take. 
As the "impending crisis" loomed, a rapidly expanding cotton crop amplified 
the bargaining power of the Deep South. From 1855 to 1860, cotton exports 
increased in va lue by 118 percent, going from $88,143,844 to $191,806,555.58 The 
1859 season turned out an incredible crop, topping 4,500,000 bales of cotton, easily 
more than double the crop of 1850.59 The cotton industry's exponential growth 
gave the cotton states a greater incentive to control the marketing and shipping of 
their own product. 
Florida, though not an enormous cotton producer, was in a position to take 
advantage of expanding production. By 1860, the sheer vo lume of the cotton trade 
57 David L. Cohn, The Life and Times of King Cotton (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 
Publishers, 1956), 121. 
58 Bruchey, ed., Cotton and the Growth a/the American Economy, Table K. 
59 Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860, Vol. 2 
(Gloucester, MA: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1958), 1026. 
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had pushed Apalachicola's cotton receipts above 130,000 bales, back to its levels of 
1850.1851.60 Apalachicola's percentage of the cotton market had decreased, but the 
development of rail lines throughout the Deep South allowed for previously 
underutilized lands to be devoted to cotton production so that all significant 
southern ports saw an increase of cotton exports in the two years preceding the 
Civil War, including ApaJachicola,61 Florida port cities stood to profit from this 
enormous growth. 
The actual distribution of cotton shipments in 1860 indicated that Florida 
ports, however, were not nearly as prominent as competing sh ipping centers. 
Despite attempts by merchants and entrepreneurs in north Florida to establish the 
infrastructure to facilitate massive cotton exportation, Florida ports continued to lag 
behind their neighbors to the west and east. Florida's cotton shipping totals in 1860 
amounted to just 9 percent of the amount of cotton shipped out of New Orleans 
during that same year. 
Number of Cotton Bales Handled, less transshipments between the ports 
Vear Ending 31 August 1860" 
Apalachicola, St. Marks, and other Florida ports 
Galveston, Texas 
Charleston, South Carolina 
Savannah, Georgia 
Mobile, Alabama 
New Orleans, Louisiana 
60 Willoughby, Fair to Middlin', 14. 
192,724 
252,424 
509,308 
531,219 
843,012 
2,139,425 
6] Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, A History a/Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt to 
1860 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908), 20. 
62 Lewis Cecil Gray, History 0/ Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860, 696. 
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Throughout the antebellum period, the cotton trade shifted dramatically 
from port to port, seeking the path of "'east resistance,"63 From the period covering 
1855 through 1860, New Orleans experienced a 94 percent increase in its total 
exports. During the same period, Savannah's imports increased by 128 percent and 
Mobile 171 percent.64 Cotton was the dominant export for each of these ports. The 
export figures were increasing at all cotton ports due to increased CUltivation, but 
some faster than others, as bales were routed over rail lines as fast as southern 
engineers could lay track. In the years before the war, shipping options were 
plentiful and growing. 
The dynamic nature of cotton exportation seen in the shifting hubs of 
commerce meant that control of Florida's ports were as important to the nation's 
prosperity as New Orleans, Mobile, Savannah, Charleston, and Galveston. The 
federal government could not allow the existence of foreign ports in such proximity 
to the Cotton Belt for fear of losing control of the cotton trade. If Florida were 
allowed to peaceably secede, cotton shipments would pour out of the state and be 
exchanged for federally untaxed import goods. 
The United States government needed control of the southern ports but 
lacked the ability to enforce that control at the moment of secession. Three months 
after Florida seceded from the Union, the federal government declared a blockade 
on all southern ports. The inability of the United States to effectively enforce this 
blockade during the first year of the war gave the Confederacy options as to how to 
proceed regarding their cotton trade. Shipments from the cotton ports to New York 
63 Willoughby, Fair to Middlin', 7. 
64 Bruchey, ed., Cotton and the Growth a/the American Economy, Table M. 
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bound for Europe ceased abruptly, as was appropriate for belligerent parties. Direct 
shipments to England and France before the blockade could be enforced, however, 
presented opportunities for either much needed revenue or diplomatic coercion, 
but not both. 
The Confederacy could have utilized the time it took the United States to 
build an adequate naval force in order to sell as much cotton as possible to fund the 
growing conflict. Instead, the South opted for what became known as King Cotton 
Diplomacy. During the early years of the war, the South pressured England to 
recognize the sovereignty of the Confederacy and perhaps to even intervene in the 
war on their behalf. The theory held that a self-imposed embargo on the cotton 
trade with England would have such disastrous effects on the British economy that 
the superpower would have no choice but to recognize southern independence and 
pay top dollar to continue clothing their people.65 Though preventing cotton from 
leaving through the weak blockade engendered more European support for the 
southern cause, the South missed out on a opportunity to generate much needed 
revenue to prosecute the war.66 
Florida had its share of proponents in favor of a coercive cotton policy. 
James B. Owens, a delegate to the secession convention in Florida, argued "the 
cotton states alone, without the firing of a single gun, could by one years masterly 
enactivity (sic), lock the wheels of every important interest throughout the civilized 
world.'" Owens went on to suggest that cutting off the cotton supply would bend the 
6S Hamilton Cochran, Blockade Runners of the Confederacy (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1958), 28. 
66 Woodman, King Cotton and His Retainers, 207, 208. 
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world's commercial and manufacturing powers to the will of the South.67 Governor 
John Milton was an ardent supporter of King Cotton diplomacy, taking "legal, extra-
legal, or actually illegal" actions to halt the unapproved traffic of cotton through the 
federal blockade afte r taking office in October, 1861. Milton maintained this policy 
until Confederate Attorney-Generalludah P. Benjamin disallowed further 
interference with a n already fede rally restricted trade.68 The Confederate 
leadership had decided that the revenue of cotton sales took precedence over the 
attempt to coerce European involvement. 
Realizing the amount of revenue being sacrificed by ceasing al l cotton 
exports, the Confederate congress lifted the embargo on cotton trade so that 
blockade· runne rs cou ld use Florida ports to smuggle cotton out of the Deep South. 
More effective blockades were in place around the Savannah/Charleston and 
Pensacola/Apalachicola regions, so the Confederates made use of a small inter· 
coastal waterway at Mosquito Inlet to head down the east coast to Titusville, where 
cotton could be loaded onto blockade runners heading to Caribbean markets.69 
With the lack of improved transportation in Florida during the war, running cotton 
out of the peninsula was difficult, but not impossible. The extensive rail system in 
Georgia was put to use, along with wagons and river steamers and the Florida 
67 James B. Owens, "The Right, Causes and Necessity for Secession: Argument of the 
Hon. James B. Owens, delegate to the State Convention of Florida on the secession 
resolutions of Florida," State Convention of Florida on the Secession Resolutions of 
Florida, 1861, p. 29 in Confederate Imprints, 1861-1865, ed. Crandall. 
68 Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations afthe Confederate 
States of America (Chicago: The University orChicago Press, 1931), 19, 36-37. 
" Taylor, Rebel Storehouse, 32-33. 
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Railroad line, to get at least some cotton to port during the warJo As the war 
progressed, the Confederate government employed agents in negotiating sales for 
cotton to foreign buyers through blockaded ocean ports.71 Cotton faded as a 
bargaining chip and instead became once again a commodity for acquiring other 
goods. 
In an effort to resupply and acquire more wealth, planters employed 
blockade-runners to deliver the cotton to market, not always meeting with success. 
Rear Admiral Bailey reported to the U.S. Secretary of the Navy in October 1863 of 
the destruction of Confederate profiteer James McKay's steamer the Scottish Chief 
and the sloop Kate Bale in the Hillsborough River as the vessels were loading with 
cotton and about to set sail. The Admiral took some pride in believing he had sent a 
clear message to the Rebels concerning the future of Rebel cotton shipments.72 
McKay also reported a similar incident that year, noting that about a hundred enemy 
troops Hwent up to where a steamer lay loaded with cotton named after our friend 
A.B. Noyse and set her afire and destroyed her 'ere we were aware."73 No fewer 
than eighty-six ships carrying cotton were captured or destroyed by the blockading 
squadron throughout the conflictJ4 But as late as January 1864. the U.S. minister to 
France informed Secretary of State Seward that cotton was being run through the 
70 Ibid. 
71 Woodman, King Cotton and His Retainers, 217. 
72 Frank Moore. ed., The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events with 
Documents, Narratives, J1Justrative Incidents, Poetry. Etc., Vol. 7 (New York: D. Van 
Norstrand Publishing, 1864), 566. 
73 James McKay to Pleasant White, October, 18, 1863, White Letterbook, July 15, 
1863 - April 12, 1864, Pleasant White Papers, Florida Historical SOCiety, Cocoa, FL. 
74 Taylor, Rebel Storehouse, 38-39. 
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blockade surrounding Florida with little interference.1s Blockade-runners like 
McKay used these shipments to bring back highly demanded foodstuffs that 
commanded a high price along Florida's coast. 
As the war concluded, cotton growers made use of the internal 
improvements to resume more regular shipment of cotton from Florida ports. The 
New York Times reported that as early as July 1865, trains were arriving in 
Jacksonville loaded with cotton, sugar, syrup, and other products of the country, to 
be shipped to market.76 Florida's ports, unencumbered by a federal blockade, 
expanded shipping operations after the war. By the turn of the century, New 
Orleans experienced a significant decrease in cotton receipts due in part to the 
redirection of a considerable amount of traffic to Pensacola .17 According to a report 
issued by the Treasury Department in 1900, "improvements in transportation 
methods have resulted in great variations in the receipts of cotton at various ports." 
The greatest change in cotton exporting s ince the war was the growing receipts at 
cities relying on rail connections over those cities directly connected to the Cotton 
Belt by rivcr.78 Pensacola's importance to the cotton trade was not visible at the 
moment of secession, but its potential was realized in the post-Reconstruction era.19 
The ability to export cotton influenced Florida's decision for secession and 
made the state more important to the Union and the Confederacy. Severing the ties 
75 Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, 275. 
76 New York Times, August 3, 1865. 
77 Bureau of Statistics, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Cotton Trade a/the United 
Stotes and the World's Cotton Supply & Trade (Washington, D.C.:Government 
Printing Office, 1900), 2591. 
" Ibid. 
" Ibid. 
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of northern shipping and financing best protected the economic interests of 
Florida's port cities in the eyes of delegates to the state's secession convention. The 
1,800 miles of coastline that seceded from the United States along with the rest of 
the state presented the Confederacy with growing options for centers of commerce. 
Florida's ports played a minor, though not insignificant role in cotton trade during 
the secession crisis. The potential for growth in the cotton industry and the 
shipping industry made Florida a valued asset to the rest of the Confederacy. The 
very existence of Florida port cities separate and apart from the Union, connected to 
the Cotton Belt by train and river, posed a risk to federal tax revenues and the flow 
of income from England and France into the United States. Because of the potential 
to ship cotton directly from these ports and receive European goods in return, 
Florida held a position of economic importance to all parties concerned 
disproportionate to its small population. 
Walton County 
e sacola st. Marks 
Apalachicola 
Harbor 
Hillsborough 
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Manatee 
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Fig, 3.1. Regions important to Florida's cattle trade circa 1860, including cattle-rich 
counties and port cities for potential export and import Map by author. 
Chapter 3 
Shipping Florida Beef 
As secession turned to war, Florida's potential as a cotton exporter was 
overshadowed by its ability to supply beef cattle to soldiers in the field. While 
control of the cotton trade was a long-term priority to both the United States and 
) 
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the Confederate States as independent nations, control of the cattle trade was of 
more vital concern to the immediate war effort. If an army truly marches on its 
stomach, then Florida was a valuable asset to either side as a supplier of beef. 
Moving Florida animals, however, was not an easy task. Cyrus Parkhurst 
Condit's 1855 novel, A Trip to Florida for Health and Sport, depicted the arduous 
task of loading Florida scrub cattle aboard schooners for shipment to the West 
Indies, Charleston, and Savannah. Cattlemen drove their steers into a holding pen 
before roping and hOisting them over the bow of the ship and down into the cargo 
hold. The cows resisted mightily, unwilling to trade terra firma for an unfamiliar 
experience without a Fight. In the end, however, the cattle resigned to the will of 
their captors and stood on the sh ip "with their heads over the sides and plenty of 
fresh air," bound for distant ports, both foreign and domestic. t It is an account 
rooted in reality, as Florida's geographical distance from population centers and its 
abundance of coastline lent itself to increasing cattle shipments in place of cattle 
drives throughout the antebellum era. As the nation plotted a course towards Civil 
War, the coupling of Florida's ports with its per capita cattle holdings made the state 
a valuable commodity to Union and Confederate forces alike. 
The emerging Confederacy needed Florida's ports to ship cattle in the event 
the federal government responded with military force to the secession of southern 
states. The ability to supply troops by sea through Florida's ports as opposed to 
transporting cattle over land held the promise of expedited movement of resources. 
1 Maurice O'Sullivan & Wenxian Zhang, eds., A Trip to Florida/or Health and Sport: 
The Lost 1855 Novel of Cyrus Parkhurst Condit (Cocoa: Florida Historical Society 
Press, 2009), 55-58. 
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The Port of Tampa could potentially serve as a funnel, pulling in the mid-state cattle 
and redirecting them to the ports of Apalachicola, Pensacola. Mobile, and New 
Orleans where they could then be directed upriver or along rail lines to Confederate 
troops. The uncertainty of war made it impossible for southern interests to fully 
predict the value of Florida ports as the state's leaders opted to join the 
Confederacy, for federal response could only be predicted, not known. But the 
state's large cattle holdings, relatively small population and internal demand for 
beef, and immense coastline made Florida all the more attractive to the Confederate 
cause. 
At the time of secession, cattle had been in Florida for three and a half 
centuries. In 1521, Juan Ponce de Leon introduced the first small herd to Florida. 
He was unable to tend to them for long, having been run off and mortally wounded 
by the natives near Charlotte Harbor. Over the next fifty years, cattle trickled into 
the peninsula in small numbers, brought by Spanish conquistadors like Hernando de 
Sota, Don Diego Maldonado, and Tristan de Luna. Runaway cattle that escaped 
inland from these explorers as they trekked along the coast were the ancesto rs of 
the state's successful cattle industry, much like the oranges discarded by Spanish 
sailors gave rise to Florida's citrus industry.2 
In the early seventeenth century, as settlements and missions became more 
established, the Spanish made organized attempts at cattle ranching in Florida. 
Existing herds were still small, but adapted to the Florida landscape through 
generations of selection. Ranchers imported prime breeding stock of cattle, 
2 George H. Dacy, Four Centuries o/Florida Ranching (St Louis: Britt Printing Co., 
1940),19. 
6S 
primarily via Cuha, and these bulls mated with cows whose ancestors had arrived a 
century prior. Open range cattle grazing. as was the Spanish custom and the norm 
in colonial America, wreaked havoc on European relations with Native Americans, 
as herds tore through crop fields and devastated food supplies. Territorial 
governor Don Joseph de Zunega issued land grants to encourage settlement of the 
peninsu la in the latter half of the seventeenth century. Spanish colonists cleared 
and burned huge tracts of land, which were utilized as pasture.3 In the late 17005, 
the pasture land extended to the Pensacola area, known as "the Old Spanish 
The growth of Florida cattle occurred with setbacks and surges, subject to 
the conflicts of competing interest groups vying for control. At alte rnating times, 
European powers, Native Americans, and the United States vied for control of the 
peninsula, including the cattle, through armed conflict. A series of brutal and 
expensive wars waged against the Seminoles by the Americans in the first half of the 
nineteenth century left the peninsula with its cattle largely intact, while its native 
population had been driven out or killed. The territory had changed hands many 
times over. Power shifted from Seminole to Spanish to British to Spanish to 
American. Florida's scrub cattle roamed the land and grew in number, oblivious to 
the nationality of their herders. 
As Florida became a territory in 1821 and a state in 1845, American business 
interests moved in and sought to capitalize on the peninsula's natural resources. 
3 John E. Rouse, The Criol/o: Spanish Cattle in America (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press. 1977).76. 
4 Terry G. Jordan, North American Cattle -Ranching Frontiers: Origins, Diffusion, and 
Differentiation (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1993). 107. 
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U.S. Commissioner of Agriculture Isaac Newton wrote of Florida that "the whole 
interior ... can support a population of one hundred to the square mile with one half 
the labor required to live in the eastern and middle states,"S With approximately 
one person per square mile statewide in 1845, the entrepreneurs in Florida had 
barely begun to exploit the region's environment for profit. Captain William B. 
Hooker was the dominant cattle baron of Florida in terms of herd size throughout 
the 1850s. At the beginning of the decade, he owned more than 2,500 head. He 
nearly quadrupled this count by decade's end. Settling in the Hillsborough County 
region after leaving his birthplace in Georgia, Hooker realized the busi ness potential 
of transporting cattle by ship. In 1854, he began shipping out of Hooker's Point at 
Tampa Bay to Key West and the West Indies, supplying Florida scrub cattle to the 
small number of federal troops stationed at Florida's southern tip and thei r families 
and Caribbean island markets, which paid in Spanish gold. 6 The captain acquired 
more grazing land to the south and east of his Hillsborough operations, expanding 
his herds in the process. Getting out of the cattle game as the national pol itical 
climate worsened in 1860, Hooker sold his holdings to what would become the most 
significant partnership of Florida cattlemen during the Civil War, that of Jacob 
Summerlin and Tampa's James McKay? 
S Isaac Newton, Report of the Commissioner 0/ Agriculture for the Year 1862 
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1863). 
6 Joe Akerman, Florida Cowman, A History o/Florida Cattle Raising (Kissimmee: 
Florida Cattleman's Association, 1976), 44-45. 
7 Canter Brown, Jr., "Tampa's James McKay and the Frustration of Confederate 
Cattle-Supply Operations in South Florida," Florida Historical Quarterly 70:4 (April 
1992): 412. 
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Summerlin parlayed his meager inheritance of a few calves into a vast herd 
by careful management and acquisition of free-roaming Spanish scrub cattle. 
Spreading word ahead to cowmen that they would be sweeping the area, McKay and 
Summerlin bought up cattle at low costs to be sold primarily in the Caribbean 
market at a comfortable profit. McKay, who had been shipping cattle to the 
Bahamas since 18548, partnered with Summerlin to begin a lucrative cattle trade 
with Cuba in 1858. A series of nineteenth century revolutions on the island had 
depleted its cattle holdings, and Florida's close proximity and abundant herds 
provided an ample supply. 
McKay and Summerlin sought to connect Cuba's high demand for cattle with 
Florida's abundant supply. In August 1860, The Florida Peninsular weekly 
announced that McKay had recently purchased a steamer, which he christened The 
Salvor that was "particularly adapted for the transportation of cattle."9 That year, 
the two men exported 4,016 head of cattle to the island south of Florida via 
steamship.IO These shipments embarked out of primarily Tampa, but afte r a severe 
drought killed a large segment of the herd, prime grazing land and exportation 
shifted to Fort Myers and Punta Rassa about seventy-five miles to the south to 
afford better grazing land near the port of debarkation. McKay constructed an 
eight-hundred-foot loading dock and wharf near present-day Punta Gorda for the 
purpose of shipping cattle to Cuba. The cattle trade to Cuba took on increasing 
• Joe A. Akerman & J. Mark Akerman,Jacob Summerlin: King o[the Crackers (Cocoa: 
Florida Historical Society, 2004), 44. 
, The (Ocala) Florida Peninsular, August 4, 1860, 2:2. 
10 Brown, "Tampa's James McKay and the Frustration of Confederate Cattle-Supply 
Operations in South Florida," 414 . 
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significance for McKay and the Hillsborough economy when McKay's sawmill went 
up in flames in early 1860, taking with it five thousand to six thousand dollars worth 
of materials and numerous jobs. 11 
The fire at the mill came in a year of political and economic upheaval for 
Florida, and the nation as a whole. As secession became more of a possibility, beef 
purchasers in Cuba became concerned about the supply of Florida beef being cut off. 
By pushing so many cattle into Cuba during 1860, Mckay may have been attempting 
to cash out while he stil l could; uncertainty in the beef supply chai n drove up prices 
for cattle in Cuba and gave Florida cowmen and incentive to sell fast. Ranchers in 
Manatee County, south of Tampa, attempted to capitalize on the market as well, as 
they drove steers to the Manatee River for transport to Key West and the 
Bahamas.12 Meanwhile, cowmen to the north in Payne's Prairie drove herds forty 
miles to Baldwin to be loaded on the nearly completed Florida Railroad line so that 
they could be shipped out of Fernandina to the ports of Savannah and Charieston,13 
By the middle of the century, therefore. Florida had deep reserves of cattle 
and access ible ports to ship beef and other commod ities to strategic locations. This 
was particularly important as the nation neared war, and armies on both sides 
would need feeding. Cattle dealers themselves had only recently realized the 
enormous potential of connecting northern urban demand for fresh beefwith 
Florida's ample supply. In August 1859, the schooner G. Hoffman shipped 135 head 
11 Canter Brown, Tampa in Civil War and Reconstruction (Tampa Bay: The University 
of Tampa Press, 2000),17. 
12 John Solomon Otto, "Florida's Cattle Ranching Frontier: Manatee and Brevard 
Counties (1860)," Florida Historical Quarterly 64:1(July 1985): 55. 
13 Lars Andersen, Paynes Prairie: A History o/the Great Savannah (Sarasota, FL: 
Pineapple Press, Inc, 2001), 104. 
69 
of cattle from St. Augustine to New York. Northern shipping attempted to expand to 
hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of cattle with the use of steamships on a 
three-day journey depositing "upwards 0(200 cows to the shores of the Chesapeake 
or the banks of the Delaware River."14 Hopes for this trading network dissolved 
along with the Union, but the ability to transport live cattle out of the state to other 
markets was well demonstrated. 
Cattle were more numerous in several other states, but contingency planning 
placed a high value on Florida's scrub cattle herds because of their durability, 
proximity to water transport, and a local supply that far outstripped demand. The 
cfiolla cattle of Florida were tough and adaptable to changes in their 
surroundings.1S Rich mineral deposits in the grazing land helped to prevent salt 
sickness and skeletal deficiencies.16 While less durable herds dissipated in the 
South, the descendants of Spanish cattle in Florida flourished as they were crossed 
with other European breeds to become even better suited to Florida's ranges and 
c1imate.17 And Florida's cattle were tough, "immune to endemic stock diseases and 
able to subsist on coarse native forage, scrubs required no veterinary care and no 
supplementary fodder." 18 Therefore, Florida's scrub cattle had a ruggedness that 
was beneficial in attempts at transport 
14 Robert A. Taylor, Rebel Storehouse, 11. 
15 Akerman, Florida Cowman, 15. 
16 Dacy, Four Centuries a/Florida Ranching. 27. 
17 Akerman, Florida Cowman. 13. 
18 Otto. "Florida's Cattle Ranching Frontier," 55. 
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Though spread throughout the state, the largest herds were concentrated in 
Hillsborough and Manatee counties, in close proximity to the port ofTampa.19 This 
facilitated an easier transfer of cattle to distant ports as very li ttle land needed to be 
traversed before shipping. These herds grazed in the ideal ranch ing lands 
surrounding Tampa Bay. Hillsborough County boasted per capita cattle holdings 
that rivaled the holdings of the most cattle rich ranches in the Deep South.zO The 
1860 Census put Hill sborough's total cattle holdings at 37,820." Its ne igh boring 
county to the south, Manatee, claimed 31,930 head of cattJe,22 The state 
comptroller estimated two years later that the total number of cattle in the state had 
ri sen to 658,609 head.23 In a state where cattle could never be very far from the 
coast, the added bonus of lush grazing land and large herds in close proximity to 
Tampa Bay enhanced Florida as an asset to the emerging Confederacy. 
Florida had more ca ttle than its 140,000 people needed. When it came to 
butchering the animals, the distribution of southern population influenced what was 
served at su ppertime. In an era reliant on natural preservatives, pork proved an 
easier meat to smoke or salt; it made more sense for geographically isolated families 
to feed on smaller livestock. Pork was, therefore, much more a mainstay ofthe 
I' Sheila Lee Tagliarini, "Tampa, a Southern Cowtown, 1858-1878" (M.A. Thesis, 
University of South Florida, 1996), 26. 
zo Robert A. Taylo r, "Rebel Beef: Florida Cattle and the Confederacy, 1861-1865" 
(M.A. Thesis, University of South Florida, 1985), 8. 
'I U.S. Census Office, Agriculture o[the United States in 1860, 18. 
" Ibid. 
23 Akerman, Florida Cowman, 83. Either earlier counts were overly conservative, or 
the comptroller's figures were inflated. An increase of this magnitude is 
qu estionable, as cattle was driven out of state by land and shipped to Cuba and Gulf 
ports for Confederate consumption. Regardless of the actual number, the state's 
rich stock had dearly multiplied. 
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southern antebellum diet than beef, but war planners recognized the value of cattle 
to feed fighting forces. 24 One cow could feed many, and therefore made more sense 
to feed to armies than families, who needed to be concerned about wasting a large 
animal that could not be well preserved after slaughter. A lack of internal demand 
in a sparsely populated state had checked the growth of Florida's cattle industry. 
Even so, in 1860 there were nearly three head of cattle for every person, free or 
ens laved, in the state of Florida.25 The sparsely populated state of Florida simply 
did not need the quantity of cattle held in 1860 because its human inhabitants were 
so few and far between. In fact, the vast majority of Florida contained fewer than six 
people per square mile.26 
24 Taylor, "Rebel Beef," 1-4. 
2S U.S. Census Bureau, Agriculture o/the United States in 1860, 18; U.S. Census 
Bureau, Census Material from 1840 to 1890, Historical Census Browser. 
26 Dixon Ryan Fox, Harper's Atlas of American History (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1920),56 . 
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Fig. 3.2. Distribution of Population in 1860 showing population density of Florida and 
neighboring areas. Dixon Ryan Fox, Harper 's Atlas 0/ American History (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1920), 56. 
As the possibility of secession by the slave-holding states became a reality, 
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the logistical support Florida could offer that cause became even more apparent At 
388,060 head, Florida's cattle stock in 1860 was not as large as most of the rest of 
the Confederacy. Only South Carolina boasted fewer beef cattleP On a per capita 
basis, however, Florida was rich in livestock, ranking second among all its 
27 U.S. Census Bureau, Agriculture a/the United States in 1860, 18-38 . 
• 
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Confederate allies to only Texas, whose herds had less access than Florida's to the 
Gulf of Mexico for easier transport than over land.28 Florida's lush grazing land also 
gave it even greater potential than the vast arid sections of Texas as a source of 
nutrition for the region.29 As a result, Florida had a surplus of cattle to sell. 
1860 Population 
United States 
South Carolina 
Georgia 
Florida 
Texas 
Brevard County. Florida 
31,443,321 
703,708 
967,286 
140,424 
604,215 
246 
1860 Cattle/Human Ratio 
.8 to 1 
.7 to 1 
1.0 to 1 
2.8 to 1 
5.8 to 1:" 
31 to 1'1 
Florida's cattle surplus was a significant source of wealth and income for the 
state.32 Nearly 70 percent of the value of Tampa's exports in 1859 were from 
shipping cattIe.33 With the election of President Lincoln in November 1860, McKay 
accelerated his shipments to Cuba, purchasing nearly ten thousand head from 
William Hooker, and spending virtually all of the next seven months making runs to 
and from Cuba out of Punta Gorda.34 In the midst of the secession crisis, McKay was 
able to strike a deal with the Union garrison at Fort Jefferson and the Dry Tortugas, 
28 George E. Buker, Blockaders, Refugees & Contra bands: The Civil War on Florida's 
Gu/fCoast, 1861-1865 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993), 144. 
29 Taylor, Rebel Storehouse, 9,12. 
30 U.S. Census Bureau, Agriculture of the United States in 1860, 18; U.S, Census 
Bureau, Census Material from 1840 to 1890, Historical Census Browser. 
31 Otto, "Florida's Cattle Ranching Frontier,N 59. 
32 The Florida Peninsular, July 28,1860. 
33 Tagliarini, "Tampa, A Southern Cowtown," 30 . 
34 Brown, "Tampa's James McKay and the Frustration of Confederate Cattle~Supply 
Operations in South Florida," 414~16, 
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supplying their beef and receiving a guarantee that federal forces would not 
interfere with his cattle shipping concerns to Cuba.35 The relationships McKay 
fostered during the secession cris is with high-ranking Union officers se rved him 
well in the years to come. 
Confederate demand for beef combined with Florida's growing cattle 
industry to provide for a mutually beneficial business venture. The estimates of 
Florida's comptroller regarding the size of Florida cattle herds encouraged Colonel 
Lucius Northrop of the Confederate Commissary Bureau to tap in to the deep 
reservoir of Florida beef. The fastest way to delive r beef to from the cattle rich 
Hillsborough region to Confederate troops in action was not on the hoof or via an 
underdeveloped railway system, but rather by a straight line across the Gulf of 
Mexico and re~entering the continent at Apalachicola, Mobile, and New Orleans. 
Unfortunately for the Confederate war effort, one week to the day after the 
commencement of hostilities at Fort Sumter, President Lincoln issued an executive 
order creating a naval blockade of the states in rebellion. Lincoln acknowledged in 
his order the effects the blockade would have on local economies, stating that even 
"with a view ... to the lives and property of quiet and orderly citizens pursuing their 
lawful occupations," the act was necessary to ensure enforcement of revenue law 
and secure the safety of the high seas.36 
This blockade at first could only exist on paper. Even after the Union 
blockade of Florida's Gulf Coast officially went into effect, McKay had months before 
the U.S. Navy was able to have in position ships to effectively implement such an 
" Ibid. 
, . Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Uncoln, IV:338. 
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order. The U.S. Navy at the outset of the war consisted of a mere forty-two duty-
ready ships, with thirty vessels away on foreign assignment. Of the remaining 
twelve, only four were in port (therefore reachable by mid-nineteenth century 
communication immediately) and could be dispatched immediately to blockade the 
vast southern coastline. Despite its initial shortcomings, the blockade was serious 
and vita); by the end of the first year of the war, 188 vessels had been added to the 
federal fleet. 37 However, fewer than twenty ships maintained the East Gulf Blockade 
of thirteen hundred miles ofshoreline.38 
Colonel Northrop sought to deliver meat to Confederate soldiers east of the 
Appalachian Mountains, instructing his man in Europe to contract for blockade-
runners to deliver beef and bacon to eastern armies.39 McKay and Summerlin were 
the logical choice for such an operation. Though McKay, an entrepreneur and 
successful merchant, had declared his Unionist convictions prior to the war, he was 
an adaptable businessman capable of shifting his customer base without ideological 
quaims.40 Fearing seizure of his property due to his continued dealings with Union 
forces at Key West, McKay transferred ownership of his cattle herd to his friend and 
partner, Summerlin, the largest cattle owner in the state of Florida.41 The 
Confederate Commissary, in turn, granted Summerlin a two-year contract to supply 
2,400 steers per month to the army at a rate of eight to ten dollars per head. 
37 Buker, Blockaders, Refugees & Contra bands, 1. 
38 David J. Coles, "Unpretending Service: The James L. Davis, the Tahoma, and the 
East Gulf Blockading Squadron," Florida Historicol Quarterly 71:1 Ouly 1992): 41. 
" Buker, Blockaders, Refugees & Contrabands, 146. 
40 Brown, Tampa in the Civil War and Reconstruction (Tampa Bay; The University of 
Tampa Press, 2000), 27-28. 
41 Ibid., 30-31. 
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While Florida cattle became increasingly important to the Confederate war 
effort, the federal blockade made it nearly impossible to utilize the state's Gulfports 
to deliver beef to the mouth of the Mississippi River. The United States' 
government took decisive action to prevent the flow of cattle by sea from central 
and western Florida to Confederate troops in the Deep South. Apalachicola and st. 
Marks were the only developed ports along Florida's Gulf Coast to be aggressively 
blockaded by Union naval forces. 42 These ports, along with Mobile and New 
Orleans, would have made ideal pOints of entry for cattle from central Florida via 
Tampa Bay. The well-blockaded Apalachicola opened at the mouth of the largest 
river system in the South and New Orleans at the mouth of the Mississippi. From 
these ports, Florida cattle could have been siphoned out of Tampa, across the Gulf of 
Mexico, up the ApalachicolaJChipolaJChattahoochee River system or the Mississippi 
River. 
Florida ports were particularly important for cattle transport because of the 
lack of investment in interstate railroads that plagued the South. During the war, 
Florida's rail system was still largely undeveloped, existing on a small scale to 
connect ports within the state.43 Construction of an intra-state system linking Cedar 
Key on the Gulf coast to Fernandina on the Atlantic was completed by the onset of 
hostilities, but this merely presented the opportunity of moving cattle from one 
blockaded port to another without ever leaving the state. Meanwhile, the only 
competing rail line out of Tampa had stalled due to state subsidy disputes.44 To 
42 Buker, Blockaders, Refugess, & Contraband, 37. 
43 See Chapter 2,17. 
44 Brown, Tampa in the Civil War in Reconstruction, 7. 
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make matters worse for the Confederates, Union forces seized Cedar Key early in 
1862, cutting off any access to the railroad's terminus. Regardless, the sparsely 
populated Florida had no rail connections to population centers outside the state. 
Major C. McClenaghan of South Carolina visited Tampa in 1863 to investigate the 
difficulties in transporting cattle out of state over land. He urged the completion of a 
rail line connecting the Pensacola and Georgian Railroad at Live Oak and the 
Savannah, AJbany and Gulf Railroad a t Lawton, Georgia. 45 Major Joseph Locke, 
commissary agent for the C.S.A. in Georgia described the difficulties faced in getting 
the cattle out of Florida. 
The Cattle are scattered at this time afyear and are more difficult to 
collect tha n in the spring. The rains have been unusually heavy 
recently and the country so much under water in the Cattle region 
that it is difficult to get them out.. .. These difficulties and delays are 
quite intolerable.46 
Making the journey overland by traditional cattle drive proved a difficult task 
for a whole host of reasons. For one, the terrain to be covered was largely unsettled, 
undeveloped, and fraught with hazards. Bears, panthers, jaguars, mosquitoes, and 
especially wolves preyed on cattle herds traversing their territory.47 No cattle could 
be driven through the swamplands of sou th Florida. Even in central Florida, where 
the majority of herds grazed, high waters delayed cattle drives for months on end. 
In addition, good grazing regions were well s pread out; a lack of forage after the 
winter frosts further delayed the driving of cattle through the north of the 
45 David j. Coles, "Cattle Wars: The Civil War in South Florida, 1864-1865," Florida 
Cattle Frontier Symposium, Florida Cattleman's Association, Kissimmee, FL, 1995, 
66. 
46 P.w. White to j. L. Locke, September 8,1863, Pleasant White Letterbook, Pleasant 
Woodson White Papers, Florida Historical Society Library, Tampa, FL. 
47 Akerman, Florida Cowmen, 87. 
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peninsula.48 Florida's weather patterns posed a danger to cattle remaining in state; 
Summerlin lost several hundred head to drowning and flying debris brought on by a 
hurricane that struck the Tampa area in 1852.49 
Human interference posed an even graver concern, as state leaders feared 
that the Seminoles living in poverty and hunger could be swayed by Union 
representatives to take up arms against Confederate Commissary agents and attack 
the cattle drives. so These cattle raids had already become a common practice for 
Union forces stationed at federally held forts stretching all along the Gulf Coast of 
Florida. The U.s. Second Florida Cavalry and the Second United States Colored 
Troops, with regiments positioned at Fort Myers, Cedar Key, St. Vincent Island, and 
St. Andrew Bay, were instrumental in disrupting and discouraging cattle drives out 
of the Hillsborough and Manatee County regions.51 Major Edmund Weeks ordered 
Captains Henry Crane and James D. Green with their companies to Cedar Key for the 
express purpose of harassing cattle drives and recruiting Floridians into Union 
ranks. 52 The loyalties of Floridians exhibited the fluidity of a border state as 
deserters and refugees actively and passively assisted the federal government. 
Unruly bands of disenchanted former Confederate soldiers made it a regular 
practice to steal or kill cattle from the herds held by the Confederate Commissary. 
"lbid.,90. 
49 Akerman & Akerman,jacob Summerlin: King a/the Crackers, 30. 
so Taylor, "Rebel Beef," 62-63. 
51 Buker, Blockaders, Refugees & Contrabands, 148, 153. 
52 Ibid., 156. 
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Many of these cattle were then sold directly to the Union Army at various coastal 
cities,53 
In addition to the frustrations imposed by hostile man and beast, 
experienced cowmen capable of delivering the herd to strategic locations to the 
north were in short supply. As the Confederate Commissary Department sought to 
drive cattle northward, they discovered that the most able-bodied men had 
volunteered in the first call to arms and were unavailable to ass ist. Later 
conscription had robbed the sparsely populated state of its adult male population 
and not properly accounted for the needs of those left behind or the management of 
the state's valuable resources. Though cattlemen were able to receive an exemption 
from active military duty, enlistment numbers rose at the same time new cattle 
brands declined in Hillsborough County.54 The cattle were present; the ability and 
manpower to manage and drive the herds was absent. 
In early 1862. Union naval forces seized the town of Apalachicola to cut off 
receipts of cattle shipments from the Tampa area. The East Coast Blockading 
Squadron put a clamp on northern Gulfports of entry, but wisely created a porous 
blockade near Tampa Bay. Cattle could get out of the western gulf coast of Florida, 
but not into the panhandle or northern gulf coast ports of the Confederacy. William 
Dayton, U.S. minister to France, reported that according to his sources, huge 
segments of the west coast of Florida were left entirely unguarded. AB. Noyes, a tax 
collector at St. Marks, reported that Tampa was without any blockading vessels at 
53 Akerman, Florida Cowman, 90. 
S< Taylor, Rebel Storehouse, 94. 
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all, and that the port of Cedar Key to the north was left entirely unmolested.55 
Imposing a strict embargo on all ports was likely to turn some local sentiment 
against the Union. Instead, the federal government was able to generate sympathy 
by allowing the outflow of cattle and the return of foodstuffs to small communities 
along the southern Gulf coast. It was only when shipments threatened to 
strengthen Confederate strongholds that enforcement was stepped up. 
The outflow of cattle to Cuba greatly enriched the ranchers and shippers 
involved in the trade. Caribbean trade of cattle was preferred by ranchers because 
the Union and Confederate forces in Florida insisted on paying for cattle with their 
respective nations' currency. Cuban buyers, on the other hand, were willing to pay 
in gold doubloons. McKay and Summerlin, doubting the true value of the notes they 
were paid in due to the uncertainty of the war's outcome, shifted the focus of their 
enterprise almost exclusively to Cuba, going so far as to hide cattle from the 
Confederate Commissary so as to se ll at a later date in exchange for gold.56 Demand 
for beef was high in Cuba, and the blockade made the supply even scarcer, elevating 
the price of an eight~dollar Florida steer to two ounces of Spanish gold; benefiting 
the shippers who were ab le to run the blockade. McKay continued shipping his 
cattle to Cuba despite the blockade, though at reduced numbers. During this time, 
Summerlin's herds were able to grow at an annual rate of five to eight thousand 
calves.57 The blockade suited the cattlemen just fine, as they received top dollar for 
those cattle that got to market while the remaining herds were able to multiply. As 
S5 Frank Lawrence Owsley, King Cotton: Foreign Relations o/the Confederate States 
of America, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1931), 275, 276. 
56 Brown, Tampa in Civil War and Reconstruction, 48. 
57 Akerman & Akerman,jacob Summerlin: King of the Crackers, 51. 
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a result of Florida's ports and close proximity to Cuba, blockade-runners were able 
to inject much needed wealth into the war-torn sta te's economy. 
During the war, the people of Florida needed the blockade-runners to deliver 
supplies. Through 1861, McKay had shipped over six thousand cattle to Cuba, using 
the proceeds to purchase nour, bacon, sugar, salt, and tobacco for the return voyage 
to Florida shores, which were sold for a combination of bank notes, Confederate and 
Union scrip, and Spanish coins. Profitable shipping required the transportation of 
goods on both legs of the journey, and McKay did just that. Evading Union 
blockaders outward bound with cattle was the easy part; the Union forces had an 
incentive to allow cattle into the Gulf of Mexico as long as the ships were prevented 
from docking and unloading at northern gulf ports. The blockade was more 
concerned with McKay's return trips from Cuba and other Caribbean islands. 
McKay's expert piloting allowed him to hug the southern peninsula as he made his 
way to the Caloosahatchee River, evading Union revenue cutters that were unwilling 
to navigate the treacherous shallow waters so close to the shore. 58 The map below 
illustrates the barrier islands and intercoastal wate rways that confronted 
blockaders and runners. 
58 Dacy, Four Centuries of Florida Ranching, 52-55 . 
Fig. 3.3. South Florida's treacherous coas t, including Keys, barrier islands, and 
intercoastal waterways. Augustus Mitchell, Mitchell's New General Atlas 
(Philadelphia, PA: S. Augus tus Mitchell, 1860), 59. 
The dangers of shipwreck or ca pture and subsequent hanging were 
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outweighed by the potential payoff. Though cattle were cheap in Florida, they could 
be traded in Cuba for precious commodities: wheat flour that would fetch $125 a 
barrel, sugar forty dollars, and salt twenty-five dollars a sack.59 With such a high 
profit motive, blockade running was carried out almost exclusively by private 
contractors who catered to a combi nation of civilian demand and Confederate 
" Ibid., 56. 
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military needs.60 As such, the Cuban cattle trade allowed merchants like McKay to 
diversify their commodities to appeal to both markets. While much of this trade 
was harmless to the Union war effort, the goods sent out of state could also be used 
to purchase war materiel for Confederate troops. 
McKay's return trips held the potential for more harm to the Union war effort 
than his exportation of cattle. The exodus of cattle from the state reduced potential 
Confederate beef supplies because of the more restrictive northern Gulf Coast 
blockade. Union forces were more concerned about inbound shipments from the 
Caribbean. Realizing where the real money was, McKay apparently switched to 
dealing arms. His vessel, the Salvor, ran aground and was captured in late 1861 
carrying an impressive assortment of rifles, revolvers, large can nons, and 
ammunition purchased in Cuba.61 He was not alone. The steamer Florida effectively 
ran the blockade in 1862, carrying a cargo of twenty· five hundred rifles and sixty 
thousand pounds of gunpowder into Saint Andrews Bay.62 Florida's immense 
coastline presented the Confederates with an opportunity to smuggle arms that 
Union forces would have great difficulty restricting. 
By 1863, the war had endured far longer than either side anticipated, and 
beef supplies from other states were exhausted or fell under Union control. With 
the Confederate surrender at Vicksburg in the summer, trans-Mississippi beef 
shipments to Confederate forces shut down and all future beef supplies would have 
to come from the East. The greatest remaining concentration of cattle accessible to 
60 Thornton and Ekelund, Jr., Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation, 29. 
61 John E. Johns, Florida During the Civil War (Gainesville: University of Florida 
Press, 1963), 38. 
62 Taylor, Rebel Storehouse, 36. 
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the Confederate forces by the end of 1863 was in Florida's inte rior.63 Florida beef 
became logistically more important in feeding the Confederate soldie rs in the lower 
south, rescuing the Army of the Tennessee from starvation in the later years of the 
war,M Commander Woodhul of the U.S. Navy recognized the ri sing importance of 
Florida beef, s tating succinctly 
The cattle of Georgia, Alabama, North Carolina, a nd South Carolina 
have been consumed. Texas and the rich grazing country to the 
westward of the Mississippi being cut off, the whole dependence of 
the Confederate government to feed their army now rests on 
[Florida]'S 
McKay and Summerlin's dealings with the Confederacy never really paid out. 
Most of the 25,000 cattle delivered to the C.S.A. were paid for in Confederate 
currency or war bonds. By mid-1863, excessive counterfeiting and dismal war 
prospects had devctlued these notes. McKay took to hiding some of his herd east of 
the Kissimmee River, away from the Confederate commissary officers, until such 
time as the war had ended and he could resume unmolested trade with Cuba 
again.66 Two years later, with the defeat and surrender of the Confederate 
government, all of Summerlin's accu mulated notes were worthless. Effectively, 
Summerlin had contributed approximately 25,000 head of cattle to the Confederate 
war effort.67 All told, Summerlin's contract with the Confederate Commissary 
63 Coles, "Cattle Wars: The Civil War in South Florida," 66. 
64 Taylor, "Rebel Beef," 3. 
6S Merlin Coulter, The Confederate States of America (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1950), 398-399. 
66 Brown, Tampa in Civil War and Reconstruction, 65-66. 
67 Akerman, Florida Cowmen, 86-87; Buker, Blockaders, Refugees & Contra bands, 
146. 
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department should have netted him over $200,000, but he did not receive a dime.66 
Through utilization of notes backed by a doomed nation. the C.S.A. was able to 
exploit Summerlin's cattle holdings for the war effort to prolong its very survival. 
As the tide of the war turned, Union forces exploited the cattle holdings of the 
state. Florida's cattle had even less loyalty than the disenchanted Confederate 
troops conscripted in the same state. They filled the stomachs of any marching 
army, blue or gray. The ability to move cattle in Flor ida became a zero·sum game, 
where losses for one belligerent party were gai ns for the other. Union regiments 
stationed in Florida were encouraged to supplement their regular rations with the 
abundance of livestock and vegetation offered by the land, reducing the supplies of 
the Confederacy and making the logistics of war all the more difficult. 
Following key victories in early July 1863 at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the 
Union armies were on the offensive and began to turn to Florida for beef and other 
livestock, further weakening Confederate supplies.69 Union occupation of Florida 
coastal cities allowed for periodic raids upon the pen insula's interior, the theft of 
cattle al ready in Confederate possession, and quick retreat into fortified port cities. 
Federal cattle raids not only hu rt the Confederacy, they helped maintain the Union's 
presence in the stateJo Federal troops could be more easily sustained in Florida if 
they were not reliant on the supply chain to reach them for basic necessities. By 
pu rchasing cattle from local sources before it was bought up by Confederates with 
devalued currency, Union troops were able to extend their occupation, deny cattle to 
68 Akerman & Akerman,Jacob Summerlin: King o/the Crackers, 51 . 
69 Ibid., 57. 
70 Taylor, Rebel Storehouse, 134-136. 
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Confederate troops, and foster relationships with Floridians that a id ed in the traffic 
of supplies and intelligence. 
By 1864, federal occupation of inland fortifications allowed for the removal 
of cattle from Florida to feed northern forces, A New York Times piece pOinted to the 
importance of Florida beef as supplies in Tennessee, Virginia, South Carolina, and 
Georgia ran dry. The columnist boasted of the longstanding knowledge that Florida 
could serve as a storehouse for cattle and swine to supply armies, noting that "(t)he 
prairies afford excellent pasture; cattle require little care from their owners and no 
housing in the Winter; and, in most parts of the state, hogs fatten without any other 
support than that which they derive from the roots and mast of the forest."71 Union 
General D.P. Woodbury, Commander of Key West and the Tortugas, set a goal of 
gathering cattle from the sizeable he rds of the Caloosahatchee river valley and 
transporting them North via shipping vessels. To accomplish this goal, General 
Woodbury reoccupied Fort Myers on the southern Gulf coast, stagi ng raids on local 
cattle ranchers and disrupting the flow of beef north. Woodbury liberally estimated 
that as many as two thousand cattle per week were finding their way to Confederate 
armies from the Fort Myers area before his interdiction,12 The reoccupation of Fort 
Myers allowed the Union to reverse the flow of cattle to their own usage. Florida 
Rangers stationed in Fort Myers siphoned as many as 4,500 head of cattle out of the 
state through a long wharf they constructed for that very purpose.73 
71 New York Times, February 28, 1864. 
72 John Solomon Otto, H$ou thern Extremities; The Significance of Fort Myers in the 
Civil War: Florida Historical Quarter!JI 72 (October 1993): 141. 
13 Taylor, "Rebel 8eef," 77. 
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The Union's soft blockade and willingness to trade with locals won more 
popular support than the Confederates' demand fo r absolute commercial loyalty.J4 
While ma ny smaller ranchers lost their cattle to Confederate impressment, Union 
forces made it a rule to not seize beef belonging to Union loyalis ts. Even up the 
coast, where the blockade was stronger, Floridians were able to engage in 
commerce with the enemy. General Braxton Bragg, C.S.A., imposed economic 
sa nctions on citizens of Walton County. cutting them off from Pensacola after 
lea rn ing that locals were supplying the East Gulf Blockading Squadron with fresh 
beef and vegetables. Later, when Confederate forces had abandoned Pensacola. the 
relationships built by Union forces with local cattlemen allowed for trade to resume. 
A steamer captured by the Union Navy was used to shuttle cattle from Santa Rosa 
and Walton Coun ties to nearby Union garrisons.75 Not su rpris ingly, the local 
Floridians showed more loyalty to the forces that encou raged more commerce. 
In the spirit of forgiveness endorsed by President Lincoln, Summerlin 
successfully received a pardon for his actions supplying Confederate a rmies with 
beef. He cited in his petition that threat of having his herds impressed into 
Confederate duty with or without compensa tion and therefore chose to accept pay 
to support his family.76 Summerlin was then able to reinstate the profitable cattle 
trade with Cuba years after the war, supplying th e Spanish Army wi th beef 
74 Taylor, Rebel Storehouse, 135. 
75 Ibid., 138. 
76 "Pet ition of Jacob Summerlin," September 12, 1865, Roll IS. M- l003, Case Files of 
Applications of Former Confederates for PresidcntiaJ Pardons. 1865-67. RG 94. National 
Archives Records Administration". 
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throughout the 18705.77 In 1872, over fifteen thousand cattle were shipped to Cuba 
from U.S. Gulfports, primarily out of Florida.78 Captain Francis Hendry, who was 
still cutting his teeth as a cattleman during the Civil War, gave an even less 
conservative estimate of Florida cattle shipments after the war, citing eighteen 
thousand head of cattle being shipped out of Punta Rassa that same year.79 
Florida's cattlemen, businessmen first and southerners second, were merely 
concerned to find buyers for their li vestock - they did not care with whom they 
traded, so long as they profited. If the cowmen could not reach Confederate armies 
with their product, they were all too happy to find a welcoming foreign market in 
Havana, or in the occupying armies of the North. Newspapers appealed to the 
patriotism of Florida cowmen, asking them to stop selling beef to the enemy or to 
neutral third parties, encouraging Florida cattlemen to sell only to Commissary 
agents of the C.S.A.BO Gold. however, was more powerful than appeals to Confederate 
loyalty. and certainly more powerful than Confederate scrip. 
77 Dacy. Four Centuries of Florida Ranching. 59. 
78 42d Cong., 2d sess., 1872 H.R. Doc. No. 1482, Serial 1482. 
79 FA Hendry, "Cattle Raising in South Florida," The Semi· Tropical 3 (1877); 214· 
215. 
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Conclusion 
The root oflarge-scale human conflict is the protection of economic interests. 
While the South sought to maintain its institution of slave labor and escape the 
imposition of even higher import tariffs, the North faced the loss of federal property, 
armaments, forts, infrastructure and military investments, land, potential tax 
revenue, and control of its trading pOints of entry. The economic motivations for the 
South to secede clashed with the interests of the North in preserving the trade 
relationships that existed. In choosing the path that led to conflict over peace, 
decision-makers leaned towards what they believed would be most profitable on 
the margins. 1 
In his magnum opus of secession era politics, David M. Potter explained: 
Men are motivated by interests rather than ideals, ... they contend for 
power rather than principles, and ... moral arguments are usually 
mere rationalizations or secondary "projections," used by contending 
interest groups to convince themselves or the public that they have 
right on their side.2 
The protection of economic interests as rights can be just or unjust depending on 
their nature. Contemporary thinkers of the war era and modern historians correctly 
view the right to "wring their bread from the sweat of other men's faces"3 as wrong. 
yet some other financial motivations may not be as clear-cut. The basics of 
commerce and business interaction rang true in Antebellum America; regional 
economies linked together, creating a national interdependence and participating in 
1 Jack Hirshleifer, The Dark Side a/the Force; Economic Foundations a/Conflict 
Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 13. 
2 David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis; 1848-1861 (New York: Harper & Row, 
1976),35. 
3 Basler, ed., The Collected Works a/Abraham Lincoln, YJll:333. 
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global commerce. The southern economy benefitted from a growing and vibrant 
northern economy. and vice versa. Yet, some regional interests ran contrary to each 
other and created a climate of mutual hostility. Leaders of the secession movement 
viewed separation as the preferred method of protecting and furthering a way of 
life. Secession, however, could not be allowed in a perpetual Union, and war carne. 
The representatives to Florida's secession convention elected to join their 
brethren in South Carolina and Mississippi in attempting to exit the Union not only 
for the protection of slavery, but also for the economic considerations unique to a 
coastal state. The federal government and the emerging Confederacy saw, in 
Florida, opportunities for their own economic prosperity. The peninsula was valued 
for its strategic position separating the Gulf of Mexico from the Atlantic seaboard, 
but also as a source of cattle and a potential point of debarkation for cotton. With its 
abundant ports and growing economy, the state of Florida epitomized the 
secessionist argu ment against protectionist trade policy. 
The financial viability of a southern Confederacy was contingent upon the 
successful separation of Gulf states from the Union. A Florida unencumbered by 
commercial regulation ema nating from Washington, D.C., would have one set of 
concerns regarding its ports of entry; a Florida in the violent throes of prolonged 
civi l war would have quite another. If the state were to secede, the response of the 
fede ral government would determine which set of concerns were the more pressing. 
Historical knowledge makes it easy to look back at the secession winter as the 
inevitable precursor to war. But the participants in history knew not the eventual 
consequences of their actions and saw in Florida's ports only the inte rests they 
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could attempt to protect. The economic interests generated by Florida's Gulf ports 
provided a strong incentive for the state to secede. for the emerging Confederacy to 
support that secession, and for the United States government to resist it with force. 
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